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In my dissertation, I examined how the American public perceives Latino citizens and Latino 
representatives, particularly with respect to perceptions of political ideology. Political scientists 
have made great strides with regard to the consequences of race in American politics, and my 
dissertation tests whether ethnicity is similarly consequential. My focus on political ideology 
explores the more subtle ways in which prejudice can manifest itself in perceptions of 
ideological distance, and can create hurdles for descriptive Latino representation. I make use of 
original, experimental, observational, and survey data to examine the pliability of citizens' 
perceptions of Latino group ideology, the accuracy of citizens' perceptions of their Latino 
representative's political ideology, and to examine whether race and ethnicity influence 
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“Democrats not only betrayed their working class base. They also cynically assumed most 
Hispanics think and vote alike. That’s just wrong.” – Joe Scarborough 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Race has played and continues to play a central role in American politics (Hutchings & 
Valentino 2004). Though self-reported levels of overt racism are lower than ever (e.g. Schuman 
et al., 1997; Huddy & Feldman, 2009), race and race-based perceptions of citizens and 
politicians continue to influence the voting behavior of the American electorate (Jacobsmeier 
2015). The important role of minority legislative representation makes this influence particularly 
meaningful. Minority legislators increase descriptive representation,1 decreases perceptions of 
political alienation among minority voters, and increase political knowledge and political 
participation (Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Pantoja & Segura 2003; Griffin 2014). Like most 
phenomena, race is not only an objective aspect of American politics, but also the target of 
subjective perceptions and misperceptions. Critically, the electoral hurdle of race-based 
misperceptions is damaging to minority representation, as well as to American democracy.  
Despite the significance of race in American politics, political scientists have an 
incomplete understanding of how race and ethnicity affect citizens’ perceptions, both of other 
voters and of political representatives. The incomplete character of scholarly accounts is 
                                                          
1 Though minority legislators may increase descriptive representation, a “paradox of representation” is that there is 
an inverse relationship between descriptive representation of racial and ethnic minorities, and the substantive 
representation of minority interests in Congress (Lublin 1997). Specifically, Lublin finds that when a district is 
“packed” with racial and ethnic minorities, this district has a better chance of electing a representative aligned with 
their interests, or of having a minority representative. But because that district is “packed” with minorities, the 
surrounding districts have fewer racial and ethnic minorities; moreover, the racial and ethnic minorities in those 
surrounding districts have less influence than if they were more numerous. Subsequently, the districts surrounding 
the “packed” districts are less likely to have a minority representative, or a representative who is attentive to 
minority interests. Lublin find that the political South is dominated by conservatives who are inattentive to minority 
interests – because they can afford to be inattentive – and a handful of minority representatives. In sum, f the 
districts “cracked” minority populations so that they were more diffuse, this would reduce the likelihood of a 
minority representative; by “packing” districts, there is a greater chance for substantive representation, but racial and 




especially notable with respect to perceptions of and about Latinos.2 Scholars do not know how 
Latino citizens and politicians are perceived by the rest of the American electorate, and why 
there might be a difference in how Latinos are perceived by Anglos3 and how Latinos are 
perceived by Blacks. Scholars also do not know whether there is a difference between how the 
American electorate perceives Latino voters and how the American electorate perceives Latino 
representatives. Finally, scholars do not know how ethnicity, in this group-specific context, 
affects political outcomes, such as constituents’ approval of their representatives’ election to 
public office. Addressing these questions potentially will improve scholarly understanding of the 
connections between ethnicity and fundamental matters involving the real and perceived quality 
of representation.  
Why Latinos? 
At present, political science literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of how the American 
electorate perceives Latino voters and Latino politicians, and how those perceptions manifest 
themselves. Given the breadth and magnitude of political consequences for Anglos’ perceptions 
of black citizens and black representatives alike, I am interested to see if perceptions of Latino 
voters and Latino politicians are similarly consequential, both in terms of intergroup dynamics 
and electoral outcomes.  That said, political science scholarship also lacks a comprehensive 
analysis of Asian voters and politicians, Native American voters and politicians, and Arab 
                                                          
2 In this dissertation, I abide by the scholarly norms in political science and use “Latino,” and “Hispanic” 
interchangeably (see Barretto and Pedraza, 2009). Here, any one of these three phrases mean individuals currently 
living in the United States, who have heritage from a Spanish-speaking Latin-American country. The literature 
generally excludes Spain (a Spanish-speaking European country), and includes non-Spanish speaking Latin-
American countries, such as Brazil and Haiti. Technically speaking, “Latinos” and “Hispanics” are not synonymous, 
though the norm is to treat them as such.  




American voters. Why choose to focus on Latinos voters and Latino politicians, rather than any 
of these other racial and ethnic groups?  
Changing Demographics of the American Electorate 
 
My focus on Latino voters and politicians is largely due to the changing racial and ethnic 
composition of the United States. The U.S. census predicts that by the middle of the 21st century, 
the United States will be a majority-minority country – that is, that racial and ethnic minority 
groups will comprise a majority of the U.S. population (US Census Bureau, 2008). Latinos are 
the fastest-growing racial group in the United States.4 They are also the youngest racial or ethnic 
group in the United States (Patten 2016). About six in ten Hispanics are millennials or younger.5 
Moreover, in 2016, millennials comprised about half of eligible Latino voters (Krogstad et al., 
2016).  
In short, the majority of the American population is about to be racial and ethnic 
minorities.6 A sizable portion of that majority will be Latinos, and political science scholars still 
do not have a comprehensive analysis of how Latino voters and Latino politicians are perceived. 
Moreover, there is no analysis for how perceptions of Latino voters and Latino politicians might 
vary across racial and ethnic subgroups.   
                                                          
4 Asians and Hispanics have alternated between fastest-growing and second fastest-growing racial groups in the 
United States (Brown 2014). However, the Hispanic population growth appears to be driven by Hispanics being 
born in the United States, whereas the Asian population growth is mostly fueled by migration. Seventy-eight percent 
of the 2013 Hispanic population change in the U.S. can be attributed to births in the U.S., whereas only twenty-two 
percent is due to immigration (compared to thirty-nine percent and sixty-one percent for Asians).  
5 According to a 2014 Pew Center report, about one-third (17.9 millions) of American Latinos are under 18, and 
about a quarter (14.6 million) are millennials (aged 18 – 33 in 2014). Meanwhile, in 2014, only thirty-nine percent 
of Anglos are millennials or younger. Forty-six percent of the Asian-American population are millennials or 
younger, and about half of blacks are millennials or younger.  
6 While the United States is projected to be a majority-minority country by 2050, many of these citizens will not be 
of voting age (see footnote 5 about the youth of Latinos, especially compared to the rest of the American 
population). It will take even longer for the American electorate to be majority-minority. For example, California is 




A Shift in Strategy 
My dissertation’s focus on Latino voters and Latino politicians is also due to the changing 
strategy of both major political parties in the United States. The 2000 presidential election was 
unique for a number of reasons. One of its more defining aspects was the vigor with which the 
Democrat and Republican candidates courted the Latino vote. Both Gore and Bush ran political 
advertisements in Spanish, and both candidates made special efforts to appeal to Latino voters 
(Alvarez & Bedolla 2003). While courting the Latino vote was not particularly unusual for 
Democrats (see DeSipio 1998), it represented a shift in campaigning strategy for Republicans, 
who surmised that Latino's social conservatism and upward socioeconomic mobility meant that 
Latinos could be persuaded to cast their vote for a Republican candidate.7 
Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) point out that this shift in strategy indicates that many of the 
past lessons on long-term partisanship, which were mostly based on the Anglo experience (see 
Campbell et al., 1960), may not hold for Latinos.8 The authors first find that Latinos are a 
politically heterogeneous group – Mexican Americans and Puerto Rican Americans generally 
vote Democrat, while Cuban Americans most often vote Republican (Uhlaner & García 2001). 
The authors also find that young Latinos and recent immigrants tend to identify as independents, 
                                                          
7 During the 2016 Republican primaries and the 2016 general election, now-President Donald Trump’s stance on 
Latinos ranged from indifferent to hostile. While his outreach is generally poor, his Spanish-language 
communication missed the mark. For example, at the 2016 Republican National Convention, Spanish signs were 
available that read, “Hispanics para Trump.” The correct translation would have been, “Hispanos por Trump.” 
While both para and por mean “for” in Spanish, para is not the correct word in this instance. Con would have been 
a better option, though that might have gone over poorly (“Hispanos con Trump”). Separately, the Spanish word for 
“Hispanics” – Hispanos – was not translated correctly, either. In short, these signs suggest that there was not a lot of 
care in creating these Spanish-language messages for the Trump campaign. For example, even Google Translate 
uses the correct translation (Moreno 2016).   
8
 For example, Campbell et al’s Michigan model sets forth a theory of voting that argues that psychological 
attachment to a political party is mainly inherited from the citizen’s parents, and that this psychological attachment 
is the main predictor of vote choice. Naturalized Latino citizens have had no such socialization, nor have the 
children of naturalized Latino citizens. Thus, the lessons of partisanship in the American political behavior literature 




but that over time, their partisan identity crystallizes. This immigration experience tells an utterly 
different story about Latino partisanship and Latino political socialization than the one scholars 
have heard for decades.   
In 2012, nearly 90% of self-identified Republicans were non-Hispanic Whites (Newport 
2013). Blacks have a long-standing connection to the Democratic Party (Carmines & Stimson 
1989). Latino partisanship is different. It does not so easily map onto this traditional racial-
partisan cleavage. This means that lessons that political scientists have gleaned from how Anglos 
and Blacks navigate across partisan divides may not hold for describing how Anglos and Latinos 
navigate with one another. These lessons may also not give us much purchase for describing how 
Blacks and Latinos navigate with one another in the American political arena.  
Thus, scholars need first to establish how the American electorate as a whole perceives 
Latino voters and Latino politicians. Next, scholars will need to understand the psychological 
underpinnings of these perceptions, and how these perceptions might vary across subgroups. In 
tandem, these findings will shed insight into how the shifting racial and ethnic demographics of 
the American electorate will influence the landscape of American politics. My dissertation aims 
to provide that insight. Partisanship among Blacks and Anglos has settled into something of a 
reliable state, but Latinos do not have this sort of partisan stability yet. This means that the 
current partisan divides between Latino subgroups could grow, stay the same, or shrink within a 
few generations, particularly among Latinos who develop a stronger levels of group 
consciousness (Dawson 1994) in the form of panethnic identity (McClain et al. 2006).9 Thus, 
while I am possibly observing a phenomenon that will not last, it follows that scholars should be 
attentive to this possible dynamic in the decades to come. 
                                                          
9 Past literature finds that high levels of internal commonality among other Latino subgroups, as well as perceptions 
of racial discrimination, result in Latinos feeling a greater commonality with Blacks (Sanchez 2008).  
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Motivation for the Project: Substantive Motivations 
The motivations for my dissertation project are both substantive and theoretical. Initially, I was 
motivated by real-world observations about American politics. I was interested in the changing 
landscape of racial demographics in the United States, and how these population changes would 
influence the electoral power of minority groups. My observations of this demographic change 
then sparked an interest in learning more about how different racial groups perceive each other, 
either as political allies or as political combatants. I grew interested in learning more about the 
bases of political coalition, such as shared political ideology, or perceptions thereof. I then grew 
interested in how race influences perceptions of ideology, perceptions of ideological distance, 
and how race-based misperceptions of ideology might present an additional hurdle for minority 
candidates, and undermine minority political representation. 
Participating in and listening to political discussion deepened my interest in perceptions 
of ideology. I often heard my conversation partners disdainfully describe their political 
representatives as “too liberal” or “so conservative.” More often than not, this evaluation of the 
candidate's perceived ideology – either too liberal or too conservative – was the last word on the 
candidate's ideological alignment or policy stances. It occurred to me that ideological evaluations 
could be a form of coded language.  Perceptions of candidate ideology – and perceived 
ideological similarity with one's own ideology – should be connected to positive evaluations of 
the political representative. The representative's ascriptive characteristics, such as race and 
gender, are also connected to the valence of evaluations of the representative by their 
constituents. Questions about real-world connections between constituents' perceptions of their 
representative's ideology, the representatives' ascriptive characteristics, and constituents' 
evaluations of their representative were the major substantive motivations for my dissertation.  
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Motivation for the Project: Theoretical Motivations 
Theoretical questions reinforced my interest in this substantive puzzle. The body of work on 
intergroup perceptions, as well as an unusual finding from Berinsky et al. (2010) helped refine 
my thinking about this substantive puzzle, and triggered the particular questions I seek to answer 
in this dissertation.  Other work from political psychology literature on the American electorate's 
perceptions of ideology structured my understanding of the implications of race-based 
misperceptions. Finally, Jacobsmeier's (2015) findings on how race-based misperceptions of 
incumbent ideology influence constituent’s vote choice helped sharpen my research questions. 
This section outlines how these motivations relate to my project, both individually and in 
tandem.   
Intergroup Relations 
The real-world puzzles I observed were also puzzles in academic literature. In a nation as large 
and as diverse as the United States, it is important that scholars understand how, and how well, 
members of different racial and ethnic groups get along. The importance has been recognized by 
previous scholarship, particularly as it relates to relations between Blacks and Anglos. Most 
notably, there is an enormous body of literature on what Anglos think about Blacks. The first 
theoretical and empirical studies of racial attitudes focused exclusively on how Anglos perceived 
Blacks (e.g. Allport 1954). Overwhelmingly, the scholarship in political psychology has found 
that on average, Anglos have negative perceptions of Blacks.1011  Though the prevalence of old-
                                                          
10Blacks are stereotyped to be aggressive lazy, unintelligent, ostentatious, low-class, criminal, uneducated, and 
sexually promiscuous (Devine 1989; Mendelberg 2001; Berinsky 2010).  
11While Anglos on average have negative perceptions of Blacks, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in racial 
attitudes among Anglos. In particular, Anglos with higher-levels of education tend to have more positive attitudes 
toward Blacks (e.g. Sniderman et al., 1991). Past scholars have theorized that this relationship can be attributed to 
learning more about democratic norms in higher education, and higher education’s emphasis on cognitive skills 
(Federico 2004). Put differently, higher education teaches citizens about democratic norms, encourages citizens to 
think about the consequences of abiding by and violating these norms, which then aids in the internalization of these 
democratic norms.   
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fashioned racism may have faded (e.g. Schuman et al., 1997), in the aggregate, Anglos' negative 
racial attitudes toward Blacks persist, albeit in different, often subtler forms (Sears & Kinder 
1971; Kinder & Sanders 1996; Sears & Henry 2003).  
These findings, coupled with the demographic patterns noted above, give rise to 
questions about intergroup relations as they relate to Latinos. However, there is not a lot of 
literature on what Anglos think of Latinos. One limited exception involves research on 
perceptions of Latinos within the context of Anglos’ views of immigration. Pérez (2010) used 
the implicit association test (IAT) to establish the cognitive association between Latinos and 
immigration (for more information about the logic underlying the IAT, look to Devine 1989).  
He also demonstrated that this implicit bias against Latinos negatively affects policy preferences 
toward all immigrants, even when participants are explicitly told to focus on non-Latino 
immigrants.  
There is also not a lot of information on how Anglo perceptions of Latinos affect Anglos' 
political behavior, beyond influencing policy attitudes about immigration. For example, 
Valentino et al. (2012) demonstrate that it is group-specific affect toward Latinos, not 
generalized ethnocentrism, that drives immigration policy preferences among Anglos who were 
primed by increased media focus on Latino immigration. This finding, of course, raises questions 
regarding the antecedents of such group-specific affect.  
Intergroup Perceptions: Blacks’ Attitudes toward Latinos 
The dearth of literature on Anglos' views of Latinos is not unique. There also is not a lot of 
literature on what Blacks think of Latinos, or how these attitudes drive Blacks’ political 
behavior. In the latter case, though, much of the focus has been on a presumed competition 
between differing ethnic and racial minorities. Indeed, Blacks and Latinos have some 
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commonalities. Both Latinos and Blacks have an average educational and socioeconomic status 
well below the national average for all racial and ethnic groups (McClain & Stewart 2002), and 
experience racial discrimination specific to their race or ethnicity.12 Though Blacks and Latinos 
have these experiences in common, past scholarship has found that feelings of mistrust toward 
Latinos have prevented a political alliance from forming. From this perspective, relative 
deprivation theory gives scholars some purchase on Blacks’ attitudes toward Latinos. 
Competition over scarce resources, such as competition over jobs, housing, and local political 
influence, can increase black hostility toward Latinos (Bobo & Hutchings 1997; Gay 2006), and 
may disrupt the opportunity for positive affect toward and political alliances with Latinos 
(Borjas, 1999). 13  
Intergroup Perceptions: Latinos’ Attitudes Toward Blacks 
Though Blacks are the most likely to view other racial groups as competitors, Latinos are 
not far behind (Bobo & Hutchings 1996). Furthermore, Latinos have more negative attitudes 
toward Blacks than Blacks have toward Latinos (Mindiola et al., 2002).14 McClain et al. (2006) 
found that a majority of Latino respondents ascribed to negative stereotypes about Blacks, 
feeling that they were untrustworthy and lazy. The authors also found that Latinos were more 
likely than Anglos to harbor negative stereotypes of Blacks. Other studies reinforce these 
                                                          
12 Sanchez (2008) notes that while both Blacks and Latinos have lower levels of education and income, Blacks have 
higher educational levels and earn more on average than Latinos.  
13 Blacks who live in areas with high concentrations of Latinos report having more negative attitudes toward Latinos 
than blacks who live in areas with low concentrations of Latinos (Oliver & Wong 2003). This relationship mimics 
the one found between Anglo attitudes toward blacks and the size of the black population in the respondent's 
locality.  The difference, of course, is that there is actual competition over jobs and housing between Latinos and 
blacks. Due to socioeconomic differences between Anglos and minorities, the competition over jobs and housing is 
more perceptual than substantive, though it does exist. That said, Anglos do compete more fiercely with blacks and 
Latinos over political influence and political representation.  
14 Latinos' perceptions of black competition are moderated by the respondent's country of origin; foreign-born 
Latinos are more likely to hold negative attitudes than Latinos born in the United States.  
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findings, demonstrating that Latinos view Blacks as more dependent on welfare and as less 
intelligent than Latinos (Johnson et al., 1997).  
Though negative attitudes toward Blacks are high among foreign-born, less-educated, and 
male respondents, positive attitudes toward Blacks are highest among Latinos who report feeling 
close to other Latinos (Kaufmann 2003; McClain et al., 2006). Sanchez (2008) demonstrates that 
Latinos with a stronger perception of a shared experience with other Latinos report feeling that 
they have more in common with Black citizens. This feeling of greater commonality with other 
Latinos may increase over the next few generations, as Latino group ideology stabilizes. 
Sanchez’s findings indicate that heightened group consciousness should result in feelings of 
greater commonality with Blacks; however, Sanchez’s findings may not continue to hold as the 
Latino population continues to increase in size, and increasing their electoral power.  
As these examples demonstrate, the extant research most often has examined Anglo and 
Black opinion about Latinos, but from different perspectives. Anglos are studied as a possibly-
threatened majority group, whereas Blacks are studied as a competing minority group. Scholars 
rarely have looked at matters holistically across all three of these groups. Hence, there is not a lot 
of literature that speaks directly to why there should be a difference between how Anglos think 
about Latinos, how Blacks think about Latinos, and what Latinos think about themselves. If 
political scientists wish to better understand how members of the American electorate respond to 
one another, they cannot merely apply the lessons gleaned from Anglos’ and Blacks’ intergroup 
relations to questions about Latinos. The changing demographics of the American electorate 





Implications of Perceptions of Latinos and Latino Politicians  
In addition to learning about the bases of intergroup perceptions, I also am motivated by the 
desire to explore the implications of these views. Berinsky et al.'s 2010 study helps to establish 
the importance of this area of inquiry. The authors examined subjects' evaluations of a candidate 
before and after the candidate was involved in a sex scandal. Specifically, the authors examined 
how this sex scandal had a disparate effect on perceptions of black candidates, compared to 
Anglo candidates. The authors hypothesized that negative racial stereotypes about black 
promiscuity meant subjects would punish black candidates more harshly than Anglo candidates. 
They argued that this phenomenon occurred because a scandal with racial undertones, no 
ideological content, and implicit racial meaning activates racially-biased candidate perceptions. 
The authors found substantial support for their hypothesis. Black candidates involved in a 
sex scandal were perceived more negatively than their Anglo counterparts. This finding 
reinforces findings from other literature on activation of negative racial stereotypes (e.g. 
Berinsky & Mendelberg 2005). Building on this, I am interested in the possibility that the 
activation of stereotypes might play a role in perceptions not only of a candidate's culpability in a 
scandal, but also in broader political matters such as perceptions of the candidate's ideology. It is 
conceivable, for example, that negative information about a black candidate may lead a 
conservative Anglo voter to perceive the candidate unfavorably on personal grounds, and as 
more ideologically liberal.  
The Symbolic Nature of Ideology 
Scholarly research on the American electorate's attitudes toward ideology only deepens 
the puzzle of Berinsky et al.'s findings. Scholars have found that much of liberal and 
conservative self-identification is symbolic, not substantive (Conover & Feldman 1981; Jacoby 
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1995). In the aggregate, the American public is functionally liberal, but self identifies as 
ideologically conservative (Ellis & Stimson, working paper). Many citizens refuse to identify as 
liberal, instead identifying as conservative, even though they prefer liberal policies. In sum, for 
many American voters, there is a disconnect between ideological identity and policy preferences.  
Despite its lack of substance, ideology matters in the American context. Voters like 
candidates with whom they perceive themselves to be ideologically similar (Carlson 1990). But 
if ideology is not substantive, do citizens really like candidates because of perceived ideological 
similarity? Or, by expressing a perception of ideological similarity, are voters really just saying, 
“I like this candidate?” Conversely, by saying, “That candidate is too liberal for me, I don't like 
her,” are voters really just expressing their dislike twice? My dissertation contributes to this 
puzzle by untangling the connections between affect, race, ethnicity, and perceived ideological 
distance between a citizen and his or her representative.  
How These Motivations Inform One Another: Race-Based Misperceptions of Candidate Ideology 
Black politicians are, on average, more liberal than Anglo politicians (Lublin 1997). 
However, past research finds that objectively ideologically similar black politicians and Anglo 
politicians are not perceived as ideologically similar by Anglo citizens (Jacobsmeier 2014; 
2015). Moreover, this race-based misperception of ideology hurts black candidates. The average 
American voter self-identifies as more conservative than liberal candidates; by perceiving black 
candidates as more liberal than they actually are, voters are artificially increasing the perceived 
ideological distance between themselves and those black candidates. Perceived ideological 
similarity corresponds with preference for a candidate (Carlson 1990), meaning that this race-
based misperception leads citizens to reject candidates they might ordinarily not.  
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In sum, past scholarship finds that black candidates are perceived as more liberal than 
their issue positions warrant. Moreover, black candidates are punished more severely than 
Anglos for the same missteps, and may be perceived as more liberal afterward. It is clear that 
candidate race is interconnected with both a) perceptions of ideological distance and b) affect for 
a candidate. Citizens like candidates with whom they perceive ideological similarity, and dislike 
candidates with whom they are ideologically dissimilar (Carlson 1990). Race-based perceptions, 
rather than the citizen’s or representative’s actual ideology, may underlie these judgments about 
ideological similarity and dissimilarity. In this scenario, distortions related to race may work to 
the disfavor of minority candidates, who receive less support than they should because they are 
misperceived. These distortions also work to the disfavor of Anglo voters, who forego the 
opportunity to vote for substantively preferable candidates because, due to race-based influences 
on their judgments, they do not recognize substantive proximity when it exists.  
Political scientists have a sense of how race-based misperceptions affect black 
candidates. My dissertation will expand upon this knowledge. First, it will situate the ideology of 
Latino politicians relative to Anglo and black politicians, providing a better sense of Latino 
group ideology. Next, I will explore how citizens respond to Latino politicians, and examine the 
sorts of districts in which Latinos typically run. This information will paint a more complete 
picture of how Latino politicians are perceived by their constituents, and how these perceptions 
are linked to approval for Latino candidates.   
Theory 
Understanding how citizens perceive one another, and how they perceive their representatives, is 
crucial to a complete understanding of American politics. One of the more important perceptions 
in American politics is the perception of political ideology. A citizen’s perception of other 
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citizens’ political ideology can inform her of potential political coalitions or allies, while a 
citizen’s perception of her representative’s political ideology informs his or her judgments of that 
representative, and whether to sanction or support.  
Because learning about politics is time-intensive, cue-taking is a rational way for citizens 
to make inferences. When it comes to perceiving the ideology of other citizens and of 
representatives, partisanship is often a helpful cue. Because primaries have become more 
decentralized, more power has been given to the more volatile public, who, “stimulated by some 
irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by artful representations of interested men, 
may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn” (Madison,  1788). Handing over the reins to a more volatile public has led to more 
politically polarized representatives (Levendusky 2009). A representative’s political ideology 
became a better predictor of his or her partisanship as conservatives became Republicans, and 
liberals became Democrats. For example, if a citizen learns that her representative is a Democrat 
and she infers that he is politically liberal, she will nearly always be correct.  Because of 
increasing polarization among political elites, citizens are better-able to sort themselves into 
political parties using cues from their representatives. Like political elites, a citizen’s political 
ideology will become a better predictor of her political partisanship. 
While connection between political ideology and partisan identity may hold in the 
aggregate, I argue that there is reason to believe that this mechanism may not hold for black 
citizens and for Latino citizens. Anglos tend to be issue voters, and usually sort into the party 
that best suits the issue or issues most important to them. And because Anglos dominate the 
electorate, this relationship means that, in the aggregate, there should be a connection between 
citizens’ political ideology and citizens’ party identification.  
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By comparison, Blacks vote overwhelmingly Democrat because the relative liberalism of 
Democrats’ civil rights policies since the 1960s, as well as the black utility heuristic, which 
argues that Blacks will behave in a way that best advantages their racial group as a whole 
(Dawson 1994). So even if a black voter identified as moderate or conservative, he or she should 
still be quite likely to vote Democrat, because Democrats’ civil rights policies are more 
advantageous to Blacks than Republican civil rights policies. In short, I argue that black group 
ideology should be much more heterogeneous than their partisan behavior would betray, at least 
according to Levendusky’s theory, and that the aggregate-level connections between partisanship 
and political ideology should not hold for this subgroup. 
For Latinos, I argue that the aggregate-level connection between partisan identity and 
political ideology does not hold, though for very different reasons than for black citizens. While 
Blacks and Anglos are overwhelmingly native-born, and raised by native-born parents, for 
Latinos, this is usually not the case. Again, many behavioral models that explain political 
behavior are predicated on assumptions about political socialization. Because those assumptions 
do not hold for Latinos, these models are not as useful for predicting Latino partisanship, Latino 
group ideology, or the connections between the two.15  
In American politics, Blacks have a long-standing connection to the Democratic party. 
And because in the aggregate, political ideology is a reliable predictor of party identification, 
there is a clear, salient – even if sometimes misleading – heuristic for black group ideology. By 
comparison, there is no clear, salient heuristic for Latino group ideology. So, while citizens 
                                                          
15This is not to say that immigrants are political “blank slates.” Past scholarship theorizes that immigrants have 
“imported socialization” – that is, immigrants have the tools and the experience with political engagement from their 
country of origin, and these abilities and opportunities condition their political engagement in their new country 
(Wals 2011). Thus if an immigrant parent valued and participated in politics in her country of origin, she will 
continue to prioritize politics in the United States, passing on those lessons of political engagement to her progeny.  
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should have an easily-accessible idea of where Blacks stand, they should struggle more to put 
together a picture of Latino group ideology. 
Perceptions of Black and Latino Citizens 
One consequence of this salient heuristic for black group ideology, and the lack of a 
salient heuristic for Latinos, is that citizens’ perceptions of black group ideology should be 
relatively crystallized, and resistant to primes. Conversely, because citizens do not have an easily 
accessible heuristic for Latino group ideology, their perceptions of Latino group ideology should 
be rather pliable, and easily primed.  
Perceptions of Black and Latino Politicians 
Black and Latino representatives are overwhelmingly Democrats, and skew ideologically 
liberal. Because the cue of “Black = liberal” is easily accessible and highly salient, citizens 
should overwhelmingly be able to perceive their black representative’s political ideology 
accurately. By comparison, because there is no clear, salient heuristic for Latino political 
ideology, constituents should struggle to see the reality of their Latino representatives 
Past research finds that perceptions of ideological closeness with a representative 
correspond with higher approval for that representative (Carlson 1990). Again, I argue that this 
observation is largely driven by Anglos. Black citizens should not need to feel ideologically 
close to in-group candidates to support them. For Latinos, perceived ideological closeness should 
not be connected to warmer affect for a candidate.  
Goals for the Project 
I have several goals for this dissertation project. I want my dissertation to offer a comprehensive 
analysis of how Latino voters and Latino politicians are perceived by the rest of the American 
electorate. In order to accomplish this goal, I will examine the aggregate perceptions of Latinos, 
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as well as whether these perceptions vary across racial and ethnic subgroups. I will establish 
what these groups' judgments of Latino voters and Latino politicians are, and examine which 
factors contribute to these judgments. I am also interested in how closely Blacks’ and Anglos' 
judgments of Latino ideology map on to the reality of Latino ideology. Finally, I want to 
understand how these judgments of Latino politicians manifest themselves in politically relevant 
behavior, like candidate approval. 
Contributions 
As with any dissertation, my goal is to make a significant contribution to timely puzzles in 
American politics. As previously explicated, the twenty-first century will see substantial changes 
in the demographics of the American electorate. Scholars already have a clear insight into how 
Anglos respond to black citizens and black representatives. My dissertation will provide a clear, 
cohesive analysis of how the American electorate perceives citizens and representatives who 
belong to fastest-growing minority group in the country – Latinos.  
At the elite level, there are more Latino members of Congress than ever. The 115th 
Congress currently has four Latino senators and thirty-four Latino representatives. This 
represents a steady increase from eleven Latinos in the 101st Congress, nineteen Latinos in the 
105th Congress, and twenty-six Latinos in the 112th Congress.  My dissertation provides a timely 
response to this growing number of Latino representatives by providing answers to the following 
questions: is there a crystallization of Latino group ideology? How are Latino politicians 
perceived by the American electorate? And how do these perceptions influence their ability to 





Contributions to American Political Science 
I want to contribute broadly to the literature on American political behavior. My dissertation will 
provide a detailed, comprehensive look at how one part of the American electorate perceives 
another part of the American electorate. Further, it will examine the real-world implications of 
those perceptions. Scholars know that race is important in U.S. electoral politics, but scholars do 
not yet fully understand either the specific significance of views toward Latinos or, more 
complexly, the interrelationships among views of Latinos, Blacks, and Anglos. By addressing 
these matters, my dissertation will offer a model for how future scholars can most fruitfully 
engage the political dynamics associated with the nation's changing demographic characteristics. 
Moreover, I am testing whether mechanisms which are useful for describing aggregate 
behavior hold across racial and ethnic subgroups. If the mechanisms hold, then my dissertation 
will provide important evidence regarding the breadth of these theories. If these mechanisms do 
not hold, then my dissertation will provide evidence that there are important conditions under 
which these theories do not usefully explain citizen’s behaviors and perceptions.  
Dissertation Chapters Outline 
There are four substantive chapters in my dissertation. Chapters 2 establishes that the general 
connections between ideology and partisanship is largely driven by Anglos, and that there are 
institutional, political, and sociological justifications for Blacks’ and Latinos’ weaker 
connections between these two identities. In Chapter 3, I examine the pliability of perceptions of 
Latino group ideology, compared to the relative rigidity of perceptions of black group ideology. 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on how the American electorate perceives Latino politicians. 
Chapter 4 uses real-world observational and survey data to test constituents’ abilities to perceive 
their representative’s political ideology accurately. Chapter 5 uses experimental data as a 
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complement to establish how primes about a representative's race, as well as the prestige of an 
election, influence citizens' approval of candidates, perceptions of the representative's ideology, 
and perceptions of ideological distance from that candidate. I summarize these findings and 
outline plans for future research in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I argue that the aggregate-level connections between citizens’ political ideology 
and their partisan identity is largely driven by Anglos. Due to their majority-status, Anglos have 
the luxury of being issue voters, and are able to connect their political ideology to their partisan 
identity. Meanwhile, for Blacks, there are institutional, political, and sociological reasons for 
voting overwhelmingly Democrat, despite the relative heterogeneity of black group ideology. 
Because Latinos are disproportionately foreign-born and first-generation, assumptions about the 
American political socialization – and the lessons about using political ideology to sort into a 
partisan identity – do not hold. I use pooled data from the American National Elections Study 
(ANES) from 1978 - 2014 to test my hypotheses, and find that while Anglos connect their 
political ideology to their partisan identity, Blacks and Latinos do not. However, I find that 
educational attainment conditions the ability of Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos to connect their 
political ideology to their partisan identity. For Anglos and Latinos, higher-levels of education 
enable the citizen to better-connect their political ideology to their partisan identity.  
This suggests that for Latinos, the connection between political ideology and partisan 
identity will grow stronger as they achieve parity with Anglos in terms of education. For Blacks, 
higher levels of education do not improve connections between their political ideology and their 
partisan identification, suggesting that educational parity will not strengthen their connections 
between their political ideology and partisan identity. Even though Blacks and Latinos are 
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currently alike in terms of the strength of the connection between political ideology and partisan 
identity, this similarity may fade over time.  
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I argue that the simplicity of the cue for black partisanship should lead citizens to 
easily make inferences about black group ideology. Furthermore, because of the long-standing, 
politically salient connections between black Americans and the Democratic party, these 
perceptions should be resistant to primes about the changing nature of black group ideology. By 
comparison, the heterogeneity of Latino partisanship means that there is no simple cue for Latino 
partisanship, suggesting that perceptions of Latino group ideology should be pliable, and 
susceptible to primes about the changing nature of Latino group ideology.  
I use original experimental data from the student subject pool at the University of Illinois 
to demonstrate the pliability of perceptions of Latino group ideology. In my experiment, subjects 
were first asked to report their perceptions about the ideological composition of Anglos, Blacks, 
Latinos, and Asians. Subjects were then asked to read an op-ed about anticipated trends in the 
upcoming midterm elections. In the first study, subjects either read that Blacks were becoming 
more liberal, or that Blacks were becoming more conservative. In the second study, subjects 
either learned that Latinos were becoming more liberal, or that Latinos were becoming more 
conservative.   
After reading the op-eds, subjects were again asked about the perceived ideological 
composition of the four racial and ethnic groups. I expect for subjects who read op-eds about 
black group ideology to have fairly inflexible perceptions of black ideology. Conversely, because 
there is no easy, salient cue for Latino partisanship or Latino group ideology, I expect for 
subjects’ perceptions to be easily primed by information about the changing nature of Latino 
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group ideology. I found partial support for my hypotheses. While subjects were indeed willing to 
adjust their perceptions of Latino group ideology to be more in-line with the prime, subjects were 
also willing to believe that Blacks were becoming more conservative. However, subjects were 
unwilling to believe that Blacks were becoming more liberal. These results suggest a sort of 
cognitive ceiling effect; because subjects already believe Blacks to be liberal, they are unwilling 
to believe that Black group ideology could become even more liberal – even though a) the 
ideological heterogeneity of Black group ideology, as well as b) the high number of ideologically 
uncertain Blacks would suggest that Blacks certainly could become more liberal. I discuss the 
implications of these differences for campaign messages, as well as citizens’ attitudes toward 
these racial and ethnic groups.  
Chapter 4 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I turn to how the American electorate perceives Latino politicians vis-à-vis 
their ideology. In Chapter 4, I examine how race and ethnicity – both of the constituent and of 
the representative - condition the ability of constituents to perceive the reality of their 
representative’s political ideology. I argue that citizens should overwhelmingly perceive their 
black representatives accurately, thanks to the salient, easy heuristic of black group ideology. By 
comparison, citizens should be less adept at seeing the reality of their Latino representative’s 
ideology. To test my hypotheses, I pool American National Election Survey data, DW-Nominate 
scores, Sulkin’s House Contextual data, and my own original data to examine this mechanism 
across 18 Congresses. In keeping with my hypotheses, I found that constituents were able 
perceive their black representative’s ideology accurately, but had more trouble seeing the reality 
of their Latino representatives. Strikingly, I found that Latino citizens “projected” their own 
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political ideology on to the ideology of their Latino representatives; Latino citizens did not 
“project” their political ideology on to the ideology of black or Anglo representatives.  
Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5, I use experimental data from a nationally-representative jury pool to examine the 
connections between perceived ideological closeness and approval for a candidate. Subjects were 
asked to read five politician’s brief profiles. After reading the profiles, subjects were asked to 
evaluate all five politicians. Subjects were asked to rate how favorably they felt toward each 
candidate and the perceived ideology of the candidate. Finally, subjects were asked how many of 
the five candidates would be acceptable. Two pieces of information are experimentally 
manipulated. A third of subjects read the profiles of five Anglo politicians, while another third 
read the profiles of four Anglo politicians and a black candidate. The final third of subjects read 
the profiles of four Anglo politicians and a Latino politician. A second manipulation varied the 
level of the election; half of the candidates were running for election to the U.S. House, whereas 
the other half were running for county commission. 
 In my analyses, I find that a candidate’s race and ethnicity do not influence a subject’s 
perceptions of that candidate’s ideology, perceptions of ideological distance from that candidate, 
or favorability toward that candidate. Instead, I find that general tendencies for perceptions of 
closeness with candidates, or general favorability toward candidates, is the foremost determinant 
of how candidates responded to the candidate in question. This finding, as well as the inclusion 
of Latino candidates in the experimental conditions, adds important nuance to the study of race 
and perceptions of political representatives.  
Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, I summarize the findings of the previous four chapters. I draw on the substantive 
findings from the previous four chapters to tell a cohesive story about how the American 
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electorate responds to Latino voters and Latino representatives. Next, I outline the implications 
of my dissertation for American politics, as well as political science literature. I then discuss the 
limitations of my projects, and justify the project in spite of its limitations. I close by discussing 










Chapter 2: Connections Between Political Ideology and Partisan Identity 
Introduction 
In order to understand how the American electorate perceives Latino voters and politicians vis-à-
vis their ideology, it is first crucial to understand ideology, and the identities to which ideology is 
connected. Specific to this dissertation, I examine the connections between a constituent’s 
political ideology and the person’s partisan identity. I argue that the connection between political 
ideology and partisan identification in the American electorate is largely driven by Anglos, and 
that this connection does not hold for other subgroups in American politics. I then discuss why 
the relationship between political ideology and partisan identification is much weaker for Blacks 
and for Latinos. Using pooled data from the American National Election Survey, I find that for 
Anglos, political ideology is a statistically significant predictor of partisan identity; meanwhile, 
Blacks and Latinos do not have this sort of connection between political ideology and partisan 
identification.  
 I conclude by discussing the anticipated ramifications of these differences. Namely, 
because for Anglos the connection between party identification and political ideology is quite 
strong, Anglo citizens should use partisan behaviors as an inference for black group ideology, as 
well as Latino group ideology. Because there is a strong, clear cue for black partisanship, Anglos 
should have a clear – however misguided – inference for black group ideology, both in terms of 
black voters and black representatives. By comparison, because there is no strong, clear cue for 
Latino partisanship, Anglos should not have an easy, accessible heuristic for Latino group 
ideology. I discuss the anticipated ramifications of this lack of an easily-accessible heuristic in 





The American electorate is dominated by Anglos. Omnibus surveys are dominated by Anglo 
respondents. Jury pools and subject pools are overwhelmingly dominated by Anglos. Scholars 
often use observational or experimental data from these Anglo-dominated sources to test their 
theories, or restrict their datasets to Anglo respondents only. In doing so, scholars run the risk of 
assuming that the observed mechanisms hold for non-Anglo subgroups. American political 
scholarship finds that there is a strong connection between partisanship and ideology, made 
stronger in recent years by the increasing polarization in American politics. I argue that this 
strong relationship between political ideology and partisan identification is mostly an Anglo 
phenomenon, and that scholars should not expect for Blacks and Latinos to have such strong 
connections between their political ideology and their partisan identification. 
 For Anglos, there is a strong relationship between political ideology and partisan 
identification. And because the American electorate is majority-Anglo, this relationship drives 
much of what scholars and pundits alike observe about the American electorate. But the sheer 
number of Anglos in the American electorate drowns out the variation in this mechanism across 
different racial and ethnic subgroups. I argue that while in the aggregate there is a strong 
connection between political ideology and partisan identity, this connection does not hold for 
black constituents or for Latino constituents.  
The Connections Between Political Ideology and Partisan Identity 
Due to the democratization of primaries, more ideologically extreme candidates have won public 
office (Levendusky 2009). This polarization means that at the elite level a representative’s 
political ideology has become a better predictor of her partisanship. A consequence of this 
connection is that citizens have taken cues from their representatives, sorting themselves into 
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political parties according to their issue positions. In sum, for representatives and constituents 
alike, political ideology has become a better predictor of partisan identity.  
Political Ideology and Partisanship – Black Constituents 
 I argue that while this connection between political ideology and partisan identity appears 
in aggregate level analyses, that this connection should be much weaker for Black constituents. 
Anglos have the luxury of sorting into whichever political party best suits them, and often do not 
have concerns that might override this sorting. Meanwhile, the relative liberalism of the 
Democratic Party’s positions on civil rights, in combination with the black utility heuristic, 
means that Blacks are much more likely to vote Democrat. Even though black group ideology is 
quite heterogeneous, Blacks face different constraints when it comes to partisan sorting. Because 
Blacks prioritize race and civil rights issues, any underlying heterogeneity in issue positions is 
not strong enough to outweigh this prioritization of race and civil rights issues; as a result, 
Blacks have a strong Democratic tilt, and overwhelmingly cast their votes for the Democratic 
candidate. 
 Consider a counterfactual, in which Anglos were all highly racially resentful, but were 
otherwise divided on economic and social issues. If sorting according to their racial resentfulness 
outweighed their positions on economic and social issues, Anglos would all “sort” into the same 
party, despite the presence of underlying heterogeneity. This suggests that Anglos’ relationship 
with their political ideology and partisan identity is truly different than what is going on with 
Blacks, and how Blacks connect their political ideology to their partisan identity  
Political Ideology and Partisanship – Latino Constituents 
In the United States, Anglos and Blacks are overwhelmingly native-born, and are thus 
socialized from birth within the American political system. Moreover, Anglos and Blacks are 
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overwhelmingly born in the United States, to American parents. This means that the parents were 
socialized within the American political system. By comparison, Latinos are much more likely to 
be foreign-born or first generation Americans than their Anglo or Black counterparts (see Table 
2.1).  
Table 2.1: Foreign-Born and First-Generation Anglo, Black, and Latino Respondents (ANES 
































For Latinos, political ideology is less a story about race, which underpins traditional 
behavioral models of political ideology in American politics. Instead, for Latinos, political 
ideology is more a story about being an immigrant. Instead of trying to shoehorn Latinos into a 
racial story along the traditional Anglo / black racial divide in American politics, political 
scientists are increasingly applying scholarship on past waves of immigration – such as Irish 
immigration from the mid-19th to the early 20th century – to better-understand how Latinos 
assimilate and form partisan attachments in the United States. In short, the key to understanding 
Latino attachment to political parties is to see it as an immigrant story. It follows that, over time, 
                                                          
16While ANES respondents are not representative of the Latino population, or of the eligible Latino voting 
population, it is reasonable to assume that they represent Latinos who are quite assimilated into the United States. 
Because these represent a subpopulation that is very well assimilated, it is reasonable to assume that the connections 
between political ideology and partisan identity should be even more attenuated for the rest of the Latino population. 
17Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding.  
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Latinos’ attachment to political parties will no longer be so much an immigrant story, and will 
become more akin to the “standard” black and Anglo story.18  
The Role of Education 
Past research finds that higher levels of education are connected to a greater awareness of 
politics, including more awareness of the elite cues and position-taking that drive partisan sorting 
in the first place (Zaller 1992; Levendusky 2009).  Latinos and Blacks have an average 
educational status well below the national average for all racial and ethnic groups (McClain & 
Stewart 2002). And while Blacks have institutional and group-based reasons to vote Democrat, 
Latinos are not similarly constrained. It is possible that as Latinos are increasingly comprised of 
later-generation Latinos, and as they achieve educational parity with Anglos, that the connection 
between Latinos’ political ideology and their partisan identity will grow stronger.  
In sum, there is a strong, aggregate-level connection between political ideology and 
partisan identity. I expect to find that this relationship is mostly driven by Anglos, and that this 
connection should be weaker for Latinos and Blacks. And while institutional and sociological 
pressures guide this weaker connection for Blacks, integration and education guide this weaker 
connection for Latinos. Put differently, in terms of the ideology-partisan connection, Latinos 
look quite similar to Blacks on the surface; over time, Latinos may end up looking more like 
Anglos in this regard. 
Hypotheses  
To ascertain the usefulness of my theory, I will test four hypotheses.  
 
H1: Among Anglos, a substantively strong, statistically significant relationship will exist between 
a) self-identified political ideology, and b) partisan identity. 
                                                          
18This is not to say that immigrants are blank slates, politically. Immigrants have an “imported socialization” – that 
is, they have the tools and the opportunity for political engagement in their country of origin (Wals 2011). If an 
immigrant parent valued politics in her country of origin, she will continue to prioritize politics in the United States, 




H2: Among Blacks, the relationship between a) self-identified political ideology and b) partisan 
identity will be weaker than it is among Anglos.  
 
H3: Among Latinos, the relationship between a) self-identified political ideology and b) partisan 
identity will be weaker than it is among Anglos.  
 
H4: Among Anglo and Latino subjects, higher levels of education should mean that citizens are 
better-able to connect their a) self-identified political ideology, and b) partisan identity. 
 
H5: Among Blacks, higher levels of education do not mean that citizens are better-able to 




My dependent variable is self-identified partisanship.19 Respondents were first asked “Generally 
speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or what?” 
After providing their answers, partisans were asked, “Would you consider yourself a strong 
[Republican / Democrat], or a not very strong [Republican / Democrat]?” Respondents who 
answered that they were Independents were asked, “Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican or Democratic party?” Their responses were used to form a seven-point partisan 
identification scale, where smaller numbers indicated that the respondent leaned more Democrat, 
and larger numbers indicated that the respondent leaned more Republican. Respondents could 
also respond that they did not know where they stood. In my model, I only use respondents who 
had a partisan identity; I discuss ideologically uncertain respondents later in the chapter.  
Independent Variables 
My first independent variable is a citizen’s self-identified political ideology. Respondents were 
                                                          
19 In this chapter, self-identified partisanship functions as a dependent variable, but my analysis is trying to establish 
the strength of the correlation between ideology and partisanship, and how this correlation is stronger or weaker 
across different subgroups.  
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asked to place themselves on a 7-point ideology scale.20 If subjects are able to connect their 
political ideology to their partisan identity, this variable should be positive and statistically 
significant. My second independent variable is education.21 Higher levels of education are 
connected to an increase the types of socially tolerant attitudes that the Democratic party 
espouses (e.g. Bobo & Licari 1989). Thus, I expect for a citizen’s level of education to be a 
negative and statistically significant predictor of party identification. In my second model, I 
include two dummy variables for citizen’s race. Because Blacks and Latinos are more liberal 
than their Anglo counterparts, I expect for these two dummy variables to be negative and 
statistically significant. 
 In my third model, I include interaction terms for the citizen’s race and ideology, Black X 
Ideology, and Latino X Ideology. These interaction terms will test whether there is variation 
across subgroups in respondents’ connections between their political ideology and their partisan 
identification. If the interaction terms are not significantly different from zero, this suggests that 
there is not variation in the relationship between ideology and partisan identity across subgroups. 
I anticipate that the interaction terms will be negative and significant, suggesting that the 
relationship between political ideology and partisan identity is much weaker for Blacks and 
Latinos than for Anglos. I also include an interaction term for Political Ideology X Education, to 
                                                          
20In 2000, telephone interviewers said, “When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely 
liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, extremely conservative, or 
haven’t you thought much about this?”. In 2002, interviewers said, “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals 
and conservatives. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly 
liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, extremely conservative, or haven’t you thought much 
about this?”. In all other years, interviewers said, “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. 
Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” 
21 I use a 7-point scale for education. Eight years of school or fewer was coded as a ‘1.’ Some high school, but no 
diploma was coded as a ‘2.’ A high school diploma or an equivalent was coded as a ‘3.’ A high school diploma and 
some non-academic training (e.g. trade school) was coded as a ‘4.’ Either an associate’s degree or some college, but 




see if education conditions constituents’ ability to connect their ideology to their partisan 
identity. As previously explicated, past scholarship demonstrates that higher levels of education 
are connected to a greater awareness of politics, including more awareness of the elite cues and 
position-taking that drive partisan sorting in the first place (Zaller 1992; Levendusky 2009). 
Thus, I expect for this interaction term to be positive and statistically significant.  
 In my fourth and final model, I include two three-way interaction terms: Black X 
Education X Ideology, and Latino X Education X Ideology. In doing so, I am testing whether 
education conditions whether Blacks and Latinos connect their political ideology to their partisan 
identity in ways that differ from how education conditions how Anglos connect their political 
ideology to their partisan identity. I expect for the correlation coefficient for Latino X Education 
X Ideology  to not be statistically different from zero – that is, I expect that education will 
condition how Latinos connect their ideology to their partisanship, much in the same way that 
Anglos connect ideology to their partisanship. However, because Blacks face institutional 
reasons for sorting into the Democratic party, I expect that higher levels of education will not 
guide Blacks’ relationship between their political ideology and their partisan identity. Thus, I 
expect for this correlation coefficient to be negative and statistically significant.  
Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA 
Before turning to my analysis, I present the descriptive statistics for the American National 
Election Study (ANES) data from 1978 – 2014 (Tables 2.2 - 2.5). I conducted a one-way, 
between subjects ANOVA to see if there were significant differences in levels of education 
between Anglo, Black, and Latino respondents. I found that there were significant differences 
between the three groups at the p<.001 level [F (2, 31555)= 311.2, p=0.001]. A post hoc 
comparison finds that there are statistically significant differences in education between Anglos 
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and Black respondents (p<.001), and Anglo and Latino respondents (p<.001). The differences in 
education between Blacks and Latinos are not statistically significant.  
 Next, I conducted a one-way, between-subjects ANOVA to see if there were significant 
differences in party identification between Anglo, Black, and Latino respondents. I found that 
there were significant differences between the three groups at the p<.001 level [F (2, 31545) = 
1835.8, p=0.001]. A post hoc comparison revealed that Blacks skewed Democrat (M=2.12, SD = 
1.4), that Latinos skewed slightly Democrat (M=3.14, SD = 1.87), and that Anglos skewed 
Republican (M=3.99, SD = 2.04). There were statistically significant differences between all 
three groups at the p<.001 level.  
 I then conducted a one-way, between-subjects ANOVA to test whether there were 
significant differences in political ideology between Anglo, Black, and Latino respondents. I 
found that there were significant differences between Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos at the p<.001 
level [F (2, 23328)=187.8, p=0.001]. A post hoc comparison found that Blacks were the most 
liberal (M=3.81, SD = 1.46), followed by Latinos (M=4.08, SD = 1.41), and by Anglos (M=4.34, 
1.39), and that there were statistically significant differences between all three groups at the 
p<.01 level.  
 In sum, these statistical tests suggest that there are substantive differences between 
Anglo, Black, and Latino partisanship, as well as Anglo, Black, and Latino ideology. However, 
the juxtaposition of Table 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that Blacks and Latinos may not connect their 
political ideology to their partisan identification in the same way that Anglos do. For example, in 
Table 2.4, 80 percent of Blacks are Democrats or lean Democrat, but are all over the board on 
ideology (Table 2.5). Similarly, Latinos overwhelmingly identify as Democrats or as Democratic 
leaners, but are ideologically heterogeneous (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). By comparison, Anglos’ 
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political ideology is quite balanced, and this balance appears to be reflected in their partisan 
identity. Of course, these aggregate-level observations are not enough to establish how Anglos, 
Blacks, and Latinos connect their political ideology to their partisan identity. To elucidate this 
connection, as well as how it varies across racial and ethnic subgroups, I turn to the next part of 
my analysis.  
Table 2.2: Respondent Race, ANES 1978 - 201422  
Anglo Black Latino TOTAL 
24, 173 (75.9%) 4,487 (14.1%) 3,177 (10%) 31,837 
 
 
Table 2.3: Respondent Education, ANES 1978 - 201423 
Race / 
Ethnicity 













































































































































































                                                          
22Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
23 Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
24 Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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In order to test my hypotheses, I run four separate models, using ANES data from 1978 - 2012. 
In each of the models, I account for the pooled nature of the data; specifically, I used robust 
standard errors, clustered around the year in which the survey was administered. By clustering 
the data, I account for correlation between observations in each particular year, which addresses 
potential issue with heteroscedasticity. I present the results of my analysis in Table 2.6. 
 In my first model, I find that political ideology is the biggest determinant of partisan 
identification; on average, citizens are using their political ideology to sort into political parties. 
Curiously, education is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the more educated an 
individual is, the more likely they are to identify as conservatives. In my second model, I found 
evidence that Latinos, and to a greater extent Blacks, identify on average as more Democratic-
leaning than their Anglo counterparts.  
 In my third model, I examined how education conditioned citizens’ ability to connect 
their political ideology with their partisan identification. I found evidence that, on average, 
education enables citizens to better-sort into political parties on the basis of their political 
ideology. In this fuller model, I find that the variable for Education is negative and statistically 
significant, in keeping with expectations. In this model, I also examined whether race and 
                                                          
25 Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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ethnicity conditioned how citizens connected their political ideology to their partisan identity. I 
find that for Latinos, and to a greater extent Blacks, the relationship between the citizens’ 
political ideology and their partisan identity is much weaker than it is for Anglo citizens.  
 Education conditions how citizens connect their political ideology to their partisan 
identity, and, on average, Latinos and Blacks have an average educational and socioeconomic 
status well below the national average for all racial and ethnic groups (McClain & Stewart 2002). 
To examine the extent to which the weaker relationship between political ideology and partisan 
identity can be attributed to differences in educational achievement, I include two 3-way 
interaction terms, Black X Education X Political Ideology and Latino X Education X Political 
Ideology. I found that higher levels of education enabled Latinos to connect their political 
ideology to their partisan identity, in the same way that Anglos do. However, higher levels of 
education do not strengthen Blacks’ connections between their political ideology and their 
partisan identity. This suggests that Blacks’ weaker relationship between ideology and party 
identification cannot be attributed to educational differences between Blacks and Anglos, and 
that as Latinos achieve parity with Anglos in terms of education, that the weaker relationship 




Table 2.6: Predicting Party Identification for Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos: ANES 1978 - 2012 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




























Education X Political 
Ideology 




     








     
Black X Education X Political 
Ideology 
   -0.03 * 
(0.01)  
Latino X Education X 
Political Ideology 
   0.002 
(0.009) 
     








N 24030 23904 23904 23904 
R^2 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.35 
F-statistic, d.f. 436.89 (2, 15) 
*** 







For ease of interpretation, I include the following graphs for Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos 
(Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). The red line indicates a lower education level, one standard deviation 
below the mean. The blue line indicates a higher education level, one standard deviation above 
the mean. Confidence intervals for these best-fit lines are shaded in grey. These graphs 
demonstrate how education can condition citizens’ connections between their political ideology 
and their party identification. 
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 For Anglos and Latinos, higher levels of education mean that citizens are better-able to 
connect their political ideology to their partisan identification (Figure 2.1). Less educated 
citizens have a harder time using their ideology to sort into a political party. For Blacks and 
Latinos, differences in education predicted Blacks’ ability to sort into a political party, as long as 
the citizen identified as liberal or liberal-leaning (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Liberal Blacks were 
better-able to sort into the Democratic party better if they were more educated. However, once 
the citizen identified as a moderate or a conservative, education no longer conditioned their 
connections between their political ideology and party identification.  
 Thus, for Anglos and Latinos, different levels of education drive differences in ability to 
connect their political ideology to their partisan identification. This result suggests that as 
Latinos reach parity with Anglos in terms of education levels, they may sort into political parties 
in the same way that Anglos sort into political parties, and their connections between ideology 
and partisanship may crystallize. For Blacks, education did not condition the connections 
between political ideology and partisanship in the same way, suggesting that education does not 
moderate Blacks’ relationship between their political ideology and their partisanship. My results 
are consistent with my hypotheses, and suggest that there are substantial differences in how 









Figure 2.1: The Conditioning Effects of Education on Anglos’ Connections Between Political 





















Figure 2.2: The Conditioning Effects of Education on Blacks’ Connections Between Political 













Figure 2.3: The Conditioning Effects of Education on Latinos’ Connections Between Political 
















My theory is also predicated on the assumption that citizens are ideologically certain – that is, 
that they are able to place themselves on an ideological continuum. In the 1978 – 2012 ANES 
data, I found that 20 percent of Anglos were ideologically uncertain, that 28 percent of Latino 
respondents were ideologically uncertain, and that 37 percent of Black respondents were 
ideologically uncertain. I conducted a one-way, between subjects ANOVA to see if there were 
significant differences in levels of ideological uncertainty between Anglo, black, and Latino 
respondents. I found that there were significant differences between the three groups at the 
p<.001 level [F (2, 31834)=341.52, p=0.001]. There were statistically significant differences in 
the levels of ideological uncertainty between all three groups at the p<.001 level. Black 
constituents and Latino constituents are more ideologically uncertain than their Anglo 
counterparts. But, as the results from my previous section suggest, even when black and Latino 
constituents are ideologically certain, there is not a strong connection between their political 
ideology and their partisan identity.  
Conclusion 
This chapter established that aggregate-level observations about citizens’ linkages between their 
political ideology and their partisanship occurs mostly among Anglo voters. Despite their 
ideological heterogeneity, black constituents overwhelmingly identify as Democrats for 
historical, political, and institutional reasons. The ideology-partisan connection is similarly weak 
for Latinos, who are mostly foreign-born and first-generation Americans. I find that higher-levels 
of education enable Latinos to make stronger connections between their ideology and their 
partisanship, much in the same way that Anglos do. This suggests that among Latinos, this 
weaker relationship is driven by lower-levels of educational attainment, and that as Latinos draw 
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closer to parity with Anglos in terms of educational achievement, that this ideology-partisanship 
connection should be stronger. Among Blacks, higher-levels of education do not strengthen the 
ideology-partisanship connection, which suggests that educational parity with Anglos would not 
yield a stronger ideology-partisanship connection. Put differently, in terms of the ideology-
partisanship connections, Latinos are behaving quite a bit like Blacks, but could end up looking a 
lot more like Anglos as Latinos become better integrated.  
 In the next chapter, I begin to unpack the ramifications of these differences. Because 
there is a long-standing, highly-salient connection between black Americans and the Democratic 
party, citizens should infer that Blacks are liberal. Moreover, this inference should be fairly 
resistant to primes, due to the long-standing nature of black Americans’ connection to the 
Democratic party. However, because black representatives are overwhelmingly liberal, the 
“Black = liberal” heuristic should enable citizens to perceive their black representatives 
accurately. By comparison, I argue that there is no long-standing, highly-salient connection 
between Latinos and any one political party. The lack of an easy, accessible heuristic should 
mean citizens that will be more susceptible to primes about Latino ideology, and that 
constituents will be less-able to see the reality of their Latino representative’s ideology.  
 In a country as diverse as the United States, intergroup relations are central to 
understanding political power. Different groups must build coalitions with one another in order 
to increase their electoral power. This need for coalition-building is especially prominent in first-
past-the-post electoral systems, such as the United States. The steady increase in racial and 
ethnic diversity means that the United States’ status as a majority-minority country is an 
inevitability. In order to gain electoral power, different groups will have to bridge divides and 
build coalitions. While it is possible for two groups to hold their noses and form a political 
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alliance, a successful political coalition is much more likely if the two groups perceive 
similarities with one another, and have positive affect for one another. This suggests that 







Chapter 3: Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology and Black Group Ideology 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I theorized that for Anglos, there should be a strong connection between 
their political ideology and their political partisanship, but for Blacks and Latinos, that this 
ideology-partisanship connection is much weaker. Despite Blacks’ ideological heterogeneity, 
there are historical, institutional, and sociological forces that incentivize them to vote for the 
Democratic party; for Blacks, increases in education did not strengthen the ideology-partisanship 
connection. Among Latinos, though the ideology-partisanship connection was also weak, 
education strengthened Latinos’ ability to connect their ideology to their partisan identification, 
similarly to how education conditions Anglos’ connections between ideology and partisanship. 
Thus, while Latinos and Blacks currently both have weak ideology-partisanship connections, as 
Latinos achieve educational parity with Anglos, Latinos may look more like Anglos in terms of 
the strength of the ideology-partisanship connection.  
 In sum, for Anglos, there is a strong connection between political ideology and partisan 
identity. For Blacks and Latinos, this relationship is much weaker. I argue that because Anglos 
connect their political ideology to their partisan identity, they should apply this framework to 
perceptions of black and Latino partisanship and political ideology. That is, Anglos should make 
inferences about black and Latino ideology based on cues about black and Latino partisanship. In 
my previous chapter, I demonstrated that Blacks are more ideologically diverse than their 
partisanship would reveal. Despite their ideological heterogeneity, Blacks overwhelmingly vote 
Democrat, meaning that there is a clear – if misguided – heuristic for black group ideology.  
 I argue that because the American electorate does not have an easily-accessible heuristic 
for Latino group ideology, that citizens' perceptions of Latino group ideology should be pliable, 
 
45 
and susceptible to primes. By comparison, citizens have an easily-accessible heuristic for Black 
group ideology, which should make citizens skeptical of messages about the changing nature of 
black group ideology. In short, citizens should be persuaded by messages about the changing 
nature of Latino group ideology, and should be resistant to messages about the changing nature 
of black group ideology.  
 This chapter serves several purposes. First, I wish to establish how citizens perceive 
Latino group ideology. Next, I wish to establish whether citizen’ perceptions of Latino group 
ideology and black group ideology are pliable. I will also examine whether this pliability is 
conditioned on the ideological content of the prime. Third, I will examine predictors of this 
pliability, in order to understand whose perceptions of group ideology are volatile, and whose 
perceptions are more crystallized.  
To test these ideas, I use original experimental data from the undergraduate political 
science subject pool at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from the spring 2017 
semester. I found that when subjects learned that either Blacks or Latinos were becoming more 
conservative, they adjusted their perceptions of the group to be more in-line with the prime. And 
while this effect was a bit more modest, subjects adjusted their perceptions of Latino group 
ideology to be more liberal upon learning that Latinos might vote Democrat in record numbers. 
However, when subjects learned that Blacks were becoming more liberal, they did not update 
their perceptions of black group ideology. Finally, I find that the politically knowledgeable are 
able to resist primes about black group ideology and Latino group ideology, whereas the less-
politically knowledgeable are susceptible to these primes. I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of these findings.  
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The purpose of this chapter is not to establish the accuracy of a citizen’s perceptions of 
black group ideology and Latino group ideology. Rather, I wish to first establish baseline 
perceptions of black group ideology and Latino group ideology. Second, I compare the pliability 
of perceptions of black group ideology to the pliability of Latino group ideology, and under what 
conditions these perceptions of black group ideology and Latino group ideology can be changed. 
The Puzzle 
Scholars know a lot about how Anglos perceive Blacks, and about their race-based perceptions 
of Blacks. Perceived black group ideology is both stable and salient due to the decades-long 
connection to the Democratic Party. Latinos have no such long-standing connection to an 
American political party. Moreover, more than one in five Latinos expresses ideological 
uncertainty. Because it is difficult for the Anglo-dominated American electorate to pin down 
where Latinos are, ideologically, their perceptions of Latino group ideology are expected to be 
more susceptible to primes about the changing nature of Latino group ideology. 
Experiments in Political Science 
Since the 1970s, political science research has relied increasingly on experiments. Experimental 
research is defined by the data-generating process (Morton & Williams, 2008), in which the 
researcher’s design is responsible for some of the variation in the data. A carefully designed 
experiment enables the researcher to attribute the variation in the data to the treatment – that is, 
that the “experimental treatments [made] a difference in the specific experimental instance” 
(Campbell & Stanley 1963).  The chief advantage of the experiment is its internal validity – that 
is, when “no reason exists to assume that some extraneous mediating factor systematically 
influenced subjects’ responses, observers can attribute changes in the dependent variable to 
systematic manipulations across the independent variables” (McDermott 2011). However, the 
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main weakness is external validity – that is, determining “to which population, settings, 
treatment variables, and measurement variables can this effect be generalized?” (Campbell & 
Stanley 1963). The complexity of the political world – the very thing that initially kept political 
scientists from using experiments – means that political scientists should be concerned with 
creating externally valid experiments (Grimmelikhuijsen 2014). 
Experiments potentially bring multiple threats to external validity. One class of threats 
relates to a study’s participants. If an experiment is conducted using a homogeneous convenience 
sample, the possibility exists that findings are unique to that sample, and would not be replicated 
in research conducted within the broader population. A second class of threats relates to a study’s 
design. If features of the experiment such as its setting or treatment conditions are highly 
artificial, then what is observed in the laboratory may not connect to any real-world 
phenomenon. 
Because my experiment was conducted via a university subject pool, concerns regarding 
the use of convenience samples apply. Implications of findings for the broader population will be 
discussed below. Concerns about design are addressed more directly. For my experiment, the 
situation I would like to emulate is a citizen reading an op-ed about the upcoming election. In 
order to make my op-ed as realistic as possible, I emulated the style and length of a USA Today 
op-ed. Each op-ed was around 350 words, on the shorter side of a newspaper op-ed, but 
consistent with the word count typical of USA Today (King, 2014). I tested the op-eds for 
readability level, as well as reading ease. All four op-eds should be easily understood by an 
average college student.26  
                                                          
26I use the Dale-Chall readability formula to assess the reading level of the op-eds. The formula counts the number 
of words in the excerpt that do not appear on a list of 3,000 common words. The more words in the excerpt that do 
not appear on this list, the higher the reading level of that excerpt.  
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University of Illinois Political Science Subject Pool Data 
The subject pool at the University of Illinois is composed of undergraduates seeking to earn extra 
credit for an undergraduate political science course. The students were informed that if at any 
point they felt uncomfortable continuing, they were permitted to excuse themselves and 
complete an alternative extra credit assignment. Apart from extra credit, there were two potential 
forms of benefits from participation in the subject pool. Students could gain greater 
understanding of how political science research works, as well as a greater understanding of how 
citizens make political decisions. Students were also assured of the confidential nature of the 
data, and were given contact information if they had any lingering questions. 
The subject pool experiments took place in two separate studies; students could have 
participated in Study 1, Study 2, or both studies. Study 1 ran from 15:00, Wednesday, February 
15th, 2017 to 15:00 Friday, February 17th, 2017. Study 2 ran from 15:00, Wednesday, March 27th, 
2017, to 15:00, Friday, March 29th, 2017. In both studies, subjects were asked a standard battery 
of demographics questions in the pre-test, including questions about their age, school year, race, 
gender, citizenship status.  
Subjects were also asked to answer 14 political knowledge questions. These questions 
were a mix of multiple-choice civics questions and current events questions, with no “don’t 
know” option to indicate that the subject did not know the answer.27 I coded correct answers as a 
“1”, incorrect answers as a “0”, and created an additive index for political knowledge. I have 
included the fourteen questions and the answer options in the appendix.  
                                                          
27 Subjects often cheat on political knowledge questions in online surveys (Clifford & Jerit, 2016). There are two 
strategies for reducing cheating. Asking subjects to commit to answering without outside help significantly reduces 
cheating. Additionally, phrasing the directive in a way that includes “forgiving” language can reduce social 
desirability pressures (e.g. Duff et al., 2007). While I still expect that some students cheated on these political 




Subjects were then asked to indicate how interested they were in politics. Subjects were 
told “We’d like to know how much attention you pay to what’s going on in politics generally. 
From day to day, when there isn’t any big election going on, would you say that you follow 
politics very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all?” I recoded the responses so that “not 
much at all” was coded as a 0, “fairly closely” was coded as a 1, and “very closely” was coded as 
a 2. 
Finally, subjects were told, “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and 
conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are 
arranged from very liberal to very conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” 
Lower scores indicated that the subject identifies as more liberal, while higher scores indicate 
that the subject identifies as more conservative.  
Descriptive Statistics 
I present the descriptive statistics for the Study 1 subject pool participants in Table 3.1 and 3.2 
(n=317), and the descriptive statistics for the Study 2 subject pool participants in Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 (n=320). Both samples are fairly balanced in terms of school year, interest in politics, and 
gender. The samples skew young, politically knowledgeable, Anglo, and toward citizens.  
In some ways, this sample is fairly representative of the Anglo dominated American electorate, 
who are also overwhelming natural born citizens. In other ways, this sample is rather 
unrepresentative. The American electorate skews older than my sample, and is not as educated as 
my sample. The American electorate is also probably not as politically knowledgeable as my 
sample is. In my methods and conclusion, I discuss how this representativeness – or lack thereof 




Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Subject Pool Participants – Continuous and Ordinal 
Variables 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
School Year (1 = freshman) 1 4 2 2.16 1.04 
Age 18 34 19 19.69 1.65 
Political Ideology (1 = extremely 
liberal) 
1  7 3 3.1 1.66 
Political Knowledge 1 12 9 8.42 2.31 
Political Interest (0 = low interest) 0 2 1 1.02 0.68 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Subject Pool Participants – Dichotomous Variables 
Variables Yes No 
Race   
Anglo 222 95 
Black 28 289 
Latino 40 277 
Asian 53 264 
Native American 3 314 
Race = other 14 303 
Race = DK 1 316 
Citizenship Status   
Citizen 292 25 
Non-citizen 25 292 
Gender   
Woman 170 147 
Man 146 171 
Non-binary 1 316 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Subject Pool Participants – Continuous and Ordinal 
Variables 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
School Year 1 4 2 2.13 1.03 
Age 18 34 19 19.68 1.62 
Political Ideology (1 = extremely 
liberal) 
1 7 3 3.09 1.64 
Political Knowledge 1 12 9 8.42 2.29 











Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Subject Pool Participants – Dichotomous Variables 
Variables Yes No 
Race   
Anglo 226 94 
Black 28 292 
Latino 40 280 
Asian 52 268 
Native American 2 318 
Race = other 13 307 
Race = DK 1 319 
Citizenship Status   
Citizen 293 27 
Non-citizen 27 293 
Gender   
Woman 168 152 
Man 151 168 
Non-binary 1 319 
 
Perceptions of Group Ideology 
Subjects were also asked to report on their perceptions of Anglo group ideology, black group 
ideology, Latino group ideology, and Asian group ideology. Subjects were asked to report which 
percentage of each group they thought identified as 1) extremely liberal, 2) liberal, 3) moderate, 
4) conservative, 5) extremely conservative, and 6) ideologically uncertain. For each of these 
ideological categories, subject used sliders, which ran from 0% to 100%.  
The subject pool coordinator set up the sliders so that all four racial and ethnic group’s ideology 
added up to 100%. The subject pool coordinator also randomized the order in which the racial 
and ethnic groups appeared. Subjects were not permitted to move on to the next section until 
they had reported their perceptions for all four racial and ethnic groups.  
I created a summary measure of perceived ideology, excluding perceptions of ideological 






Summary Measure = ((-1X % Extremely Liberal) + (-0.5 X % Liberal) + (0 X % Moderate) + 
(0.5 X % Conservative) + (1 X % Extremely Conservative))/(1 - % uncertain) 
I then rescaled the measure to run from 0 to 1. Lower numbers indicated that the subject thought 
that the group’s ideology was more liberal, while higher numbers indicated that the subject 
perceived the group’s ideology to be more conservative.  I constructed these measures for 
baseline perceptions of group ideology, as well as primed perceptions of group ideology. I report 
the descriptive statistics for these baseline perceptions below. I report the Study 1 descriptive 
statistics in table 3.5 and 3.6 (n=317), and the Study 2 descriptive statistics in Table 3.7 and 3.8 
(n=320). On average, subjects thought that Anglos were the most conservative of the racial and 
ethnic groups I examined, with Asians following closely. Subjects thought Blacks were the most 
liberal of the racial and ethnic groups, with Latinos as the second-most liberal. 
 
Table 3.5: Study 1 - Baseline Perceptions of Group Ideology 
Perceptions of ____ Group Ideology Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Anglos 0 1 0.51 0.51 0.12 
Blacks 0 1 0.34 0.33 0.12 
Latinos 0 0.81 0.39 0.38 0.13 
Asians 0.09 0.84 0.49 0.53 0.13 
 
 
Table 3.6: Study 1 - Baseline Perceptions of Group Ideological Uncertainty 
Perceptions of ____ Group Ideological 
Uncertainty 
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Anglos 0 100 0 6.06 14.94 
Blacks 0 100 0 9.54 20.36 
Latinos 0 100 1 10.43 19.15 







Table 3.7: Study 2 - Baseline Perceptions of Group Ideology 
Perceptions of ____ Group Ideology Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Anglos 0 1 0.52 0.53 0.11 
Blacks 0 0.84 0.36 0.36 0.11 
Latinos 0 0.88 0.42 0.4 0.11 
Asians 0 0.88 0.5 0.49 0.1 
 
Table 3.8: Study 2 - Baseline Perceptions of Group Ideological Uncertainty 
Perceptions of ____ Group Ideological 
Uncertainty 
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Anglos 0 100 0 5.79 10.8 
Blacks 0 100 0 7.96 15.87 
Latinos 0 100 3 9.86 17.8 
Asians 0 100 4 13.28 23.83 
 
Blocking 
After the pre-test, subjects were sorted into either the “liberal” condition, or the “conservative” 
condition. My subjects are mostly Anglos (Study 1 = 70%, Study 2 = 71%), but included a 
sizeable number of Latinos (Study 1 = 17%, Study 2 = 13%), and Asians (Study 1 = 17%, Study 
2 = 16%). The subject pool also had small numbers of Blacks, Native Americans, and other 
racial groups. While I randomly assigned subjects to conditions, I wanted to make sure that the 
subjects were uniformly distributed by race between treatment groups. For example, in Study 2, I 
wanted 14 black subjects in the “liberal” condition and 14 black subjects in the “conservative” 
condition. However improbable this outcome might be, I did not want all 28 black subjects in 
one condition, because I want my comparisons to be as uniform as possible. To reduce the racial 
variation between treatment groups, I asked the subject pool administrator to block on race in 
both experimental studies. 
Primes about Group Ideology 
Once sorted into either the “liberal” condition or the “conservative” condition, subjects were 
asked to read an op-ed about anticipated changes in the American electorate. Specifically, 
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subjects in Study 1 were primed about the changing nature of black group ideology. Study 1 
subjects were randomly assigned to read either a) an op-ed claiming that Blacks might be 
becoming more conservative, or b) an op-ed claiming that Blacks might be becoming more 
liberal. Subjects in Study 2 were primed about the changing nature of Latino group ideology. 
Study 2 subjects were randomly assigned to read either a) an op-ed claiming that Latinos might 
be becoming more conservative, or b) an op-ed claiming that Latinos might be becoming more 
liberal.  I have included the op-eds below.  
Study 1: Blacks are Becoming More Liberal 
Title: 2018 Congressional elections: Black Americans may vote Democrat in record numbers 
In 2018, more black Americans may vote for Democratic Congressional candidates than 
ever before. 
This change can be attributed to the ever-increasing income inequality in the United 
States. Income inequality has risen since the 1970s, and disproportionately affects black 
Americans. For Daron Freeman, a black second-year MBA student at the University of Illinois, 
this is the reason he will be voting for Democrats in the 2018 Congressional elections. 
“My dad paints houses, and my mom is a secretary. I grew up on the south side of 
Chicago. A lot of what Democrats say about income inequality, about making sure that 
everybody has an equal chance to succeed…it just rings very true to me. I just don’t identify with 
a lot of the messages that Republicans have for black people like me. And I do identify with the 
focus on income inequality that I am hearing from the Democratic Party, especially now.” 
This anticipated increase in black Americans voting for Democrats in 2018 can be 
attributed to former president Obama’s tenure as the first black president. It can also be attributed 
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to the current president, Donald Trump. Daron Freeman remembers how disappointed he was by 
Trump’s nomination. 
“It just makes it clear that the place in politics for black people is in the Democratic 
Party. It’s the party that best represents my political beliefs. Voting for a Republican or third 
party in 2018 is just not an option for people like me.” 
To be sure, the polls do not yet provide a clear story about how black Americans are 
going to vote in 2018. But there is reason to believe that the 2018 Congressional elections will 
see more black Americans voting for Democrats than ever before. 
Study 1: Blacks are Becoming More Conservative 
Title: 2018 Congressional elections: Black Americans may vote Republican in record numbers 
“In 2018, more black Americans may vote for Republican Congressional candidates than 
ever before. 
Some of this change can be attributed to the increase in income diversity among black 
Americans. Upper class and upper-middle class blacks are more likely to vote Republican than 
blacks with a lower socioeconomic status. Income, a historically powerful predictor of vote 
choice, could overpower blacks’ longstanding ties to the Democratic Party. 
For Daron Freeman, a black second year MBA student at the University of Illinois, this is 
the reason he’ll be voting for Republicans in the 2018 Congressional elections. 
“My dad is a doctor, and my mom is an engineer. I grew up in Naperville. A lot of what 
the Republican Party says about rewarding hard work, about making sure we can keep what we 
earn…it just rings very true to me. I just don’t identify with a lot of the messages that the 
Democrats have for black people like me. And I do identify with the business-centric things I’m 
hearing from the Republican Party, especially now.” 
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This increase in black Americans voting for Republicans can also be attributed to the 
visibility of black politicians. Herman Cain was a hopeful for the Republican candidacy in 2012, 
while Ben Carson ran in 2016, and ultimately became the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development. Daron Freeman remembers how inspired he was to see fellow black Americans in 
national politics. 
“It just makes it clear that there is a place for black people like me. Like it’s actually an 
option for me to vote for the party that best represents my political beliefs, and not just feel like I 
have to vote Democrat like most other black people I know.” 
To be sure, the polls do not yet provide a clear story about how black Americans are 
going to vote in 2018. But there is reason to believe that the 2018 Congressional elections will 
see more black Americans voting for Republicans than ever before. 
Study 2: Latinos are Becoming More Liberal 
Title: 2018 Congressional Elections: Latinos May Vote Democrat in Record Numbers 
In 2018, more Latinos may vote for Democratic Congressional candidates than ever before. 
This is change can be attributed to the ever-increasing income inequality in the United 
States. Income inequality has risen since the 1970s, and disproportionately affects Latinos. For 
Luis Gonzalez, a Latino second-year MBA student at the University of Illinois, this is the reason 
he will be voting for Democrats in the 2018 Congressional elections.  
“My dad paints houses, and my mom is a secretary. I grew up on the south side of 
Chicago. A lot of what Democrats say about income inequality, about making sure that 
everybody has an equal chance to succeed…it just rings very true to me. I just don’t identify with 
a lot of the messages that Republicans have for Latinos like me. And I do identify with the focus 
on income inequality that I am hearing from the Democratic Party, especially now.” 
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This anticipated increase in Latinos voting for Democrats in 2018 can be attributed to the 
current president, Donald Trump. Daron Freeman remembers how disappointed he was by 
Trump’s nomination.  
“It just makes it clear that the place in politics for Latinos is in the Democratic Party. It’s 
the party that best represents my political beliefs. Voting for a Republican or third party in 2018 
is just not an option for people like me.” 
To be sure, the polls do not yet provide a clear story about how Latinos are going to vote 
in 2018. But there is reason to believe that the 2018 Congressional elections will see more 
Latinos voting for Democratic candidates than ever before. 
Study 2: Latinos are Becoming More Conservative 
Title: 2018 Congressional Elections: Latinos May Vote Republican in Record Numbers 
In 2018, more Latino Americans may vote for Republican Congressional candidates than ever 
before. 
Some of this change can be attributed to the increase in income diversity among Latinos. 
Upper class and upper-middle class Latinos are more likely to vote Republican than Latinos with 
a lower socioeconomic status. Thus, an increase in the number of upper-class and upper-middle 
class Latinos means that a record number of Latinos could cast their votes for Republican 
candidates in upcoming elections.  
For Luis Gonzalez, a Latino second-year MBA student at the University of Illinois, this is 
the reason he’ll be voting for Republicans in the 2018 congressional elections 
“My dad is a doctor, and my mom is an engineer. I grew up in Naperville. A lot of what 
the Republican Party says about rewarding hard work, about making sure we can keep what we 
earn…it just rings very true to me. I just don’t identify with a lot of the messages that the 
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Democrats have for Latinos people like me. And I do identify with the business-centric things 
I’m hearing from the Republican Party, especially now.” 
This increase in Latinos voting for Republicans can also be attributed to the visibility of 
Latino politicians. Gonzalez remembers how inspired he was to see Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio 
in the 2016 Republican primaries.   
“It just makes it clear that there is a place for Latinos like me. Like it’s actually an option for me 
to vote for the party that best represents my political beliefs. Voting Democrat or third party is 
just not an option for people like me.”  
To be sure, the polls do not yet provide a clear story about how Latinos are going to vote 
in 2018. But there is reason to believe that the 2018 Congressional elections will see more 
Latinos voting for Republicans than ever before.   
Primed Perceptions of Group Ideology 
After being primed, subjects were asked to report their perceptions of Anglo group ideology, 
black group ideology, Latino group ideology, and Asian group ideology. Subjects reported these 
perceptions using the same slider function they used in the pre-test. As with baseline perceptions 
of group ideology, I calculated a summary measure of perceived ideology for these post-primed 
perceptions of group ideology.  
Methods 
Paired T-Tests: Baseline Perceptions of Anglo, Black, Latino, and Asian Group Ideology 
First, I used a series of paired t-tests to see whether the baseline perceptions of group ideology 
differ between Anglos, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians. Strikingly, for both Study 1 and Study 2, the 
differences in these perceptions of Anglo, Black, Latino, and Asian group ideology were all 
statistically significant (p<.001).  These results suggest that perceptions of group ideology appear 
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to be quite separate from one another in the minds of the American electorate.  
Correlates of Perceptions of Latino and Black Group Ideology 
In Wave 1, perceptions of Black group ideology were moderately and positively correlated with 
perceptions of Latino group ideology, r(303)= 0.32, p<.001. Perceptions of Black group ideology 
were also positively correlated with perceptions of Asian group ideology, r(291)=0.15, p<.01. In 
Wave 2, perceptions of Latino group ideology were strongly and positively correlated with 
perceptions of Black group ideology, r(308) = .54, p<.001. Perceptions of Latino group ideology 
were also moderately and positively correlated with perceptions of Asian group ideology, 
r(297)=.27, p<.001. Perceptions of Latino group ideology were weakly and negatively correlated 
with perceptions of white group ideology, but these perceptions did not reach conventional levels 
of statistical significance, r(310)=-.1, p<.1.  
Because the purpose of a regression is to tell a causal story, I could not include variables 
that were being measured simultaneously with perceptions of Latino group ideology. Despite 
their inability to contribute to the causal story, the correlates of these perceptions suggest an 
interconnectedness of perceptions of minority group ideology in the minds of the American 
electorate. So even if different mechanisms drive the baseline perceptions of Latino and Black 
group ideologies, baseline perceptions of these racial and ethnic groups are still linked to one 
another in the minds of the American electorate.  
Pliability of Perceptions of Latino and Black Group Ideology 
Having established the determinants of Latino and Black group ideology, as well as the 
correlates thereof, I turn to examine the pliability of perceptions of Latino and Black group 
ideology. I used paired sample t-tests to compare a) baseline perceptions of Black group 
ideology with b) primed perceptions of Black group ideology in Wave 1. I found that there was a 
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significant difference between baseline and primed perceptions of Black group ideology 
(p<.001). When I broke apart the subjects by experimental condition, I found that there was a 
significant difference between baseline perceptions of Black group ideology and perceptions of 
Black group ideology after being primed about the growing conservatism of Blacks (p<.001). In 
this condition, subjects adjusted their perceptions of Black group ideology to be more in line 
with the prime. However, there was not a significant difference between baseline perceptions of 
Black group ideology and perceptions of Black group ideology after being primed about Blacks 
becoming more liberal.  
I then use a series of paired samples t-tests to compare a) baseline perceptions of Latino 
group ideology with b) primed perceptions of Latino group ideology in Wave 2. I found that 
there was a significant difference between baseline and primed perceptions of Latino group 
ideology (p.<.001). When I broke apart the subjects by experimental condition, I found that in 
both conditions, there was a significant difference between baseline perceptions of Latino group 
ideology and primed perceptions of Latino group ideology (p<.001). When subjects learned 
about the changing nature of Latino group ideology, they updated their perceptions to be more in 
line with the prime.  
I report the magnitude of the mean shifts in response to the primes in Table 3.9. When 
considered together, these results suggest that the content of the prime determines subjects’ 
willingness to update their perceptions of group ideology. For perceptions of black group 
ideology, I find that subjects are resistant to primes about Blacks becoming more liberal, but are 
willing to update their perceptions of black group ideology when the subjects learn that Blacks 
are becoming more conservative. Meanwhile, though I found a statistically significant difference 
between baseline perceptions of Latino group ideology and primed perceptions of Latino group 
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ideology for subjects in the “Latino = Liberal” condition, the difference between the primed and 
unprimed perceptions are quite modest. By comparison, the difference between the primed and 
unprimed perceptions of Latino group ideology in the “Latino = Conservative” condition are 
much greater. Thus, it seems that subjects are more willing to accept information about Blacks 
and Latinos becoming more conservative; by comparison, upon learning that Blacks and Latinos 





Table 3.9: Baseline and Primed Perceptions of Black and Latino Group Ideology 
 Summary Perception of Black 
Group Ideology (Study 1) 
Summary Perception of Latino 
Group Ideology (Study 2) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Baseline Perceptions 
 




0.31 0.32 0.38 0.38 
Primed Perceptions 
(Conservative) 
0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48 
 
Directional Change for Perceptions of Latino and Black Group Ideology 
Next, I examined the predictors of the directional change in perceptions of Latino and black 
group ideology. The dependent variable is the participant’s perception of group ideology after 
the prime, subtracted from the respondent’s baseline – or pre-prime – perception of group 
ideology. When the dependent variable is negative, it means that the subject has adjusted her 
perceptions of the group ideology to be more conservative than she had originally thought. When 
the dependent variable is positive, this means that the subject has adjusted her perceptions of the 
group ideology to be more liberal than she had originally thought. I report the descriptive 
statistics for the directional change for perceptions of Latino group ideology and black group 
ideology in Table 3.10. I report my findings for perceptions of Latino group ideology in Table 
3.11, and my findings for perceptions of black group ideology in Table 3.12. 
Directional Change for Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
First, I examine predictors of the directional change in perceptions of Latino group ideology. In 
my first model, I examined the general pliability of perceptions of Latino group ideology. I find 
that perceptions of Latino ideology are generally quite pliable. Subjects who learned that Latinos 
were becoming more liberal adjusted their perceptions according, while subjects who learned 
that Latinos were becoming more conservative shifted their perceptions to be more in line with 
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the prime. However, while subjects responded to both primes, subjects responded more modestly 
to the “Latino = Liberal” prime, and more strongly to the “Latinos = Conservative” prime.  
In my second model, I included variables for the subject’s political knowledge, their 
interest in politics, their political ideology, as well as their baseline perceptions of Latino group 
ideology. The subject’s initial perceptions of Latino group ideology were the biggest predictor of 
the directional change in perceptions of Latino group ideology.  
In my third model, I examined who changed their perceptions of Latino group ideology 
and how much, upon being exposed to the prime. I find that, on average, political knowledge, 
interest, or ideology do not predict directional change in primed perceptions of Latino group 
ideology, and that the content of the prime does not condition this predictive power.  The 
statistically significant interaction term Baseline Perceptions X Conservative Treatment suggests 
that the content of the prime conditions the relationship between baseline perceptions of Latino 
group ideology and the subject’s change in perceptions of Latino group ideology. In sum, 
subjects respond to primes about changing Latino group ideology, but they responded more 
modestly to the “Latino = Liberal” prime, and more strongly to the “Latino = Conservative” 
prime.  
Table 3.10 Directional Change for Perceptions of Black and Latino Group Ideology 
Directional Change for Perceptions of  ___ Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev 
Latino Group Ideology -0.66 0.23 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 






Table 3.11: Directional Change for Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 


















Baseline Perceptions of 
Latino Group Ideology 




Political Knowledge X 
Conservative Treatment 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
Political Interest X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -0.02 
(0.02) 
Political Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  0.004 
(0.01) 
Baseline Perceptions of 
Latino Group Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  0.34 * 
(0.14) 






N 308 306 306 
Adjusted R^2 0.17 0.3 0.33 
F-statistic, d.f. 62.17 (1, 306) *** 27.66 (5, 300) *** 17.48 (9, 296) *** 
 
To ease the interpretation of the interaction term Baseline Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
X Conservative Treatment, I created a scatterplot mapping the connections between a) baseline 
perceptions of Latino group ideology, and b) the directional change in perception of Latino 
group ideology (Figure 3.1). In general, subjects who read the liberal prime adjusted their 
perceptions to be more liberal, while subjects who read the conservative prime adjusted their 
perceptions to be more conservative. Subjects who read the conservative prime made bigger 
adjustments to their perceptions of Latino group ideology than subjects who read the liberal 
prime. However, there is considerable overlap between the subjects in these two conditions, 
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suggesting that the magnitude of the change between primed and unprimed perceptions of Latino 
group ideology is rather modest.  
Figure 3.1: Directional Change for Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
 
 
Directional Change for Perceptions of Black Group Ideology 
Next, I examine predictors of the directional change in perceptions of black group ideology. In 
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my first model, I find that subjects who learned that Blacks were becoming more conservative 
adjusted their perceptions of black group ideology to be more in line with the prime. By 
comparison, subjects who learned that Blacks were becoming more liberal did not update their 
perceptions of Black group ideology. In my second model, I included variables for the subject’s 
political knowledge, their interest in politics, their political ideology, as well as their baseline 
perceptions of Latino group ideology. As with my analysis of the directional change in 
perceptions of Latino group ideology, I found that baseline perceptions of Black group ideology 
were the biggest predictor of the directional change.  
In my third model, I examined who changed their perceptions of Black group ideology 
and how much, upon being exposed to the prime. As with my previous analyses for directional 
change in perceptions of Latino group ideology, I found that, on average, the content of the 
prime does not change how political knowledge, interest, or ideology predict directional change 
in primed perceptions of Black group ideology. However, the interaction term Perceptions X 
Conservative Treatment was statistically insignificant, which suggests that, on average, the 
content of the prime does not condition the relationship between baseline perceptions of Black 
group ideology and the subject’s change in perceptions of black group ideology. This result 
suggests that, on average, primes about black group ideology do not lead subjects to update their 
perceptions of Black group ideology in the direction of the prime.  
Subjects who learned about the changing nature of Latino group ideology updated their 
perceptions to be more in line with the prime; however, the magnitude of the change was greater 
when the subject learned that Latinos were becoming more conservative, than when the subject 
learned that Latinos were becoming more liberal. By comparison, on average, primes about black 
group ideology did not lead subjects to update their perceptions of black group ideology in the 
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direction of the prime. Subjects updated their perceptions of black group ideology when they 
learned that Blacks were becoming more conservative, but did not update their perceptions of 
black group ideology after learning that Blacks were becoming more liberal. These results 
suggest that citizens are willing to believe that minorities are becoming more conservative, but 
are more resistant to suggestions that minorities are becoming more liberal.  
 
Table 3.12: Directional Change for Perceptions of Black Group Ideology 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 


















Baseline Perceptions of 
Black Group Ideology 




Political Knowledge X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -1.61e-03 
(8.22e-03) 
Political Interest X 
Conservative Treatment 
  1.65e-03 
(2.13e-02) 
Political Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -2.38e-03 
(7.16e-03) 
Baseline Perceptions of 
Black Group Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 








N 293 291 291 
Adjusted R^2 0.08 0.44 0.45 






As with the previous analyses, I created a scatterplot mapping the connections between a) 
baseline perceptions of Black group ideology, and b) the directional change in perception of 
Black group ideology (Figure 3.2). In general, subjects were much more resistant to being 
primed about Black group ideology than they were to being primed about Latino group ideology. 





Change in Perceptions of Latino and Black Group Ideology 
By taking the absolute value of the directional measure of change in perceptions of group 
ideology, I am able to examine the extent to which perceptions of Latino and Black group 
ideology are susceptible to primes. Lower values for the dependent variable indicate that the 
subject’s perceptions of Latino and black group ideology are more hardened, while higher values 
indicate that the subject’s perceptions of Latino and black group ideology are more pliable. I 
report the descriptive statistics for the absolute change in perceptions of Latino group ideology 
and black group ideology in Table 3.13. I report my findings for volatility of perceptions of 
Latino group ideology in Table 3.14, and my findings for volatility of perceptions of black group 
ideology in Table 3.15. 
A crucial assumption of regression analysis is that the data are normally distributed. 
Thought the directional measure of change is normally distributed, the absolute value of this 
directional change is positively-skewed, meaning that my dependent variable does not meet the 
necessary assumptions of regression analysis.  In order to meet this assumption, I transformed 
my dependent variable by taking the square root of the volatility of perceptions of group 
ideology. This transformation means my dependent variable is now more normally distributed 
(Table 3.13).  
Table 3.13: Absolute Change in Perceptions of Latino and Black Group Ideology 
Absolute Change for Perceptions of: Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev 
Latino Group Ideology 0 0.81 0.24 0.25 0.13 
Black Group Ideology 0.0 0.92 0.26 0.27 0.14 
 
Pliability of Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
In my first model, I examine whether the content of the prime predicts how susceptible 
subjects were to the message about the changing nature of Latino group ideology. I found that 
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subjects responded to both primes, but that they responded more modestly to the “Latinos = 
Liberal” prime, and more strongly to the “Latinos = Conservative” prime. In my second model, I 
included variables for political knowledge, political interest, political ideology, and baseline 
perceptions of Latino group ideology. I found that, on average, subjects who were more 
politically knowledgeable were more resistant to primes, while subjects who were less politically 
knowledgeable had more pliable perceptions of Latino group ideology. Additionally, I found 
that, on average, subjects with more liberal-leaning baseline perceptions of Latinos were more 
resistant to primes, and subjects with more moderate or conservative-leaning perceptions of 
Latino group ideology were more susceptible to primes.  
In my third model, I examined whether the content of the prime influenced who was 
susceptible to its message. As with the other models, I found that subjects responded more 
strongly to the conservative prime than to the liberal prime, and that, on average, higher levels of 
political knowledge made subjects more resistant to primes. I also found that for subjects who 
had more liberal baseline perceptions of Latinos group ideology, exposure to the conservative 
prime was connected to a larger overall change in perceptions than similar subjects exposed to a 
liberal prime.  The more moderate a subject’s initial perceptions of Latino group ideology, the 





Table 3.14: Pliability of Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 


















Baseline Perceptions of 
Latino Group Ideology 




Political Knowledge X 
Conservative Treatment 
  0.001 
(0.001) 
Political Interest X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -0.004 
(0.02) 
Political Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -0.013 
(0.009) 
Baseline Perceptions of 
Latino Group Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -0.86 *** 
(0.13) 






N 308 306 306 
Adjusted R^2 0.02 0.1 0.22 
F-statistic, d.f. 8.61(1, 306) ** 7.84 (5, 300) *** 10.34 (9, 296) *** 
 
In Figure 3.3, I map the baseline perceptions of Latino group ideology against the absolute 
change in perceptions of Latino group ideology, and show how the content’s prime moderates 
this relationship. Subjects in the conservative treatment make bigger adjustments to their 
perceptions of Latino group ideology than subjects in the liberal treatment. Again, the 
considerable overlap means that these changes are somewhat modest.  
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Figure 3.3: Pliability of Perceptions of Latino Group Ideology 
 
 
Pliability of Perceptions of Black Group Ideology 
Next, I turned to the pliability of perceptions of black group ideology. In my first model, I 
examined whether the content of the prime predicted the pliability of subjects’ perceptions of 
black group ideology. I found that subjects’ perceptions of black group ideology was more 
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pliable if the subjects received the conservative prime. In the second model, I included variables 
for political knowledge, political interest, political ideology, and the subject’s baseline 
perceptions of black group ideology. I found that, on average, subjects who were more politically 
knowledgeable were more resistant to primes about the changing nature of black group ideology, 
whereas less-knowledgeable subjects had more pliable perceptions of black group ideology. 
Neither interest in politics nor a subject’s political ideology were statistically significant 
predictors of the pliability of perceptions.  
 In my third model, I examined whether the content of the prime influenced who was 
susceptible to its message. I found that on average, the content of the prime did not influence 
overall pliability of attitudes. Further, whether the subject received the conservative prime or the 
liberal prime, the subject’s political ideology, political knowledge, political interest, and baseline 
perceptions of black group did not influence how pliable the subject’s perceptions of black group 
ideology were. When it came to perceptions of black group ideology, only a subject’s political 




Table 3.15: Pliability of Perceptions of Black Group Ideology 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 


















Baseline Perceptions of 





Political Knowledge X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -0.02 
(0.23) 
Political Interest X 
Conservative Treatment 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
Political Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  0.006 
(0.03) 
Baseline Perceptions of 
Black Group Ideology X 
Conservative Treatment 
  0.003 
(0.01) 






N 293 291 291 
Adjusted R^2 0.03 0.08 0.08 
F-statistic, d.f. 10.62 (1, 291) ** 6.39 (5,285)*** 3.83 (9,281) ***  
 
Subjects who were primed about the changing nature of Black group ideology made much 
smaller changes to their baseline perceptions of black group ideology than subjects who were 
primed about the changing nature of Latino group ideology (Figure 3.4). This suggests that 
while, on average, perception of Latino group ideology is pliable, perceptions of Black group 





Figure 3.4: Pliability of Perceptions of Black Group Ideology 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that because of Blacks’ long-standing connections to the Democratic 
party, there exists an easy, salient – if sometimes misleading – heuristic for Black group 
ideology. This easily accessible heuristic should mean that citizens’ perceptions of black group 
ideology are resistant to messages about the changing nature of black group ideology. By 
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comparison, there is not an easy-accessible heuristic for Latino group ideology. Thus, I expected 
to find that perceptions of Latino group ideology would be susceptible to primes about the 
changing nature of Latino group ideology. 
 When subjects learned that either Blacks or Latinos were becoming more conservative, 
they adjusted their perceptions of the group to be more in-line with the prime. And while this 
effect was a bit more modest, subjects adjusted their perceptions of Latino group ideology to be 
more liberal upon learning that Latinos might vote Democrat in record numbers. However, when 
subjects learned that Blacks were becoming more liberal, they did not update their perceptions of 
Black group ideology; more-knowledgeable subjects were especially resistant to this prime. 
These results suggest a sort of cognitive ceiling effect for perceptions of Black group ideology; 
because subjects already believe Blacks to be liberal, they are unwilling to believe that Black 
group ideology could become even more liberal – even though a) the ideological heterogeneity 
of black group ideology, as well as b) the high number of ideologically uncertain Blacks suggests 
that Blacks certainly could become more liberal.  
 My results also suggest that politically knowledgeable subjects use that knowledge to a) 
form their baseline perceptions of group ideology, and b) protect against primes that would 
update their baseline perceptions. Normatively, this is a bit of a mixed bag. To a certain extent, it 
is a normative good for citizens to use their knowledge to resist low-information, unfounded 
claims. But what if a citizen’s baseline perceptions truly do need to be updated, to reflect a 
changing political landscape? How will she learn about these changes, if she already knows 
enough to have hardened perceptions – perceptions which are now incorrect? Thus, it appears 
that political knowledge is not a silver bullet for helping citizens navigate a complicated – and 
changing – political landscape. 
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 Finally, my results suggest that while citizens’ susceptibility to primes about Blacks is 
predicated on the content of the message, that citizens’ perceptions of Latinos are more pliable. 
This means that messaging about Latinos is not constrained in the same way that messaging 
about Blacks is. For example, if a politician wanted to gin up support with a message about how 
Blacks are becoming even more liberal, this message would not meaningfully change citizen’s 
perceptions of Black group ideology, or any of the attitudes hooked into that perception. By 
comparison, a politician could either signal that Latinos are becoming more conservative or more 
liberal, and be able to prime listeners’ perceptions of Latino group ideology. For example, if a 
Republican candidate said that Latinos were becoming more conservative, Democrats and 
Republicans alike would buy into it. Republicans might perceive Latinos to be ideologically 
closer, and might be more open to policies that would benefit Latinos. Democrats might perceive 
Latinos to be ideologically distant, and push policies that would benefit Latinos further down on 
the docket. Such messages could be implicit in nature as well, and there is reason to believe that 
these implicit messages might be even more successful than the explicit ones in my experiment 
(e.g. Mendelberg 2001).  In short, the differences between the pliability of perceptions of Blacks 
and Latinos has profound implications for both implicit and explicit racial messaging in 





Chapter 4: Perceptions of Anglo, Black, and Latino Incumbent Ideology 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 established that the connection between a citizen’s ideology and the person’s partisan 
identity varied across subgroups. Specifically, the connection shows up in the aggregate because 
Anglos make this connection, and most surveys are majority-Anglo respondents.  I demonstrate 
that this connection is much weaker for Blacks and Latinos. Nevertheless, due to the long-
standing connection between black Americans and the Democratic party, citizens have an easy, 
accessible heuristic for black voting behavior and black group ideology – that is, Anglos should 
perceive that Blacks are overwhelmingly liberal, even though Blacks are ideologically diverse. 
By comparison, there is no clear, salient cue about Latino voting behavior or about Latino 
group ideology; thus, the American electorate’s perceptions of Latino group ideology should be 
more malleable and more susceptible to primes. In Chapter 3, I find that the Anglo-dominated 
subject pool saw Blacks and Latinos as quite liberal. I found that perceptions of Latino ideology 
are malleable, irrespective of the content of the prime, though citizens responded more modestly 
to primes about Latinos becoming more liberal, and more strongly to primes about Latinos 
becoming more conservative. By comparison, the pliability of perceptions of black group 
ideology was conditioned on the content of the prime. Upon learning that blacks were becoming 
more conservative, subjects were willing to update their perceptions of black group ideology; by 
comparison, upon learning that Blacks were becoming more liberal, subjects were unwilling to 
update their perceptions. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I turn to citizen’s perceptions of Latino politicians, using both real-
world observational and survey data, as well as experimental data from a jury pool. In this 
chapter, I examine how race and ethnicity influence citizen’s perceptions of their representative’s 
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political ideology. I first outline what scholars know about the American voter – their 
engagement with politics, how they process political information, and how they perceive their 
political representatives vis-à-vis their political ideology. Next, I discuss how ascriptive 
characteristics – both of the citizen and of the representative – condition constituents’ 
perceptions of their representative’s political ideology. I finish with a discussion of how these 
perceptions can influence descriptive political representation.  
I pool ANES data from 1978 to 2014, DW-Nominate data from 1976 – 2012, Sulkin’s 
House Contextual data, as well as my own original data on the ascriptive characteristics of 
incumbent legislators. I find that citizens – irrespective of the constituent’s race – have accurate 
perceptions of their black representative’s political ideology, which runs counter to the findings 
of previous research. I find that Anglo politicians are misperceived by their black constituents, 
and that Latino politicians are misperceived by their black and Latino constituents. These 
findings add important nuance to the specific ways that race and ethnicity can warp perceptions 
of representative ideology. 
American Voters’ Engagement with Politics 
There has been a long, lively debate over American voters' engagement with politics. Some of 
the first studies of political attitudes were the Columbia studies, led by Lazarsfeld in the 1940s 
and 1950s (Eulau, 1980). Later, Converse’s pioneering piece “The Nature of Belief Systems in 
Mass Publics” (1964) sparked an enormous research agenda on political sophistication. Political 
sophistication is the mechanism by which the relationship between ideological orientations and 
issue positions become strengthened (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Converse’s 
findings painted a dismal picture of the average citizen’s capabilities regarding political 
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sophistication. He found that the overwhelming majority of the electorate lacked meaningful or 
stable attitudes about issues in their political world.28 
Though some political science scholars believe Converse was correct in his observations, 
many disagree with Converse’s interpretation of his results. The scholars who disagree with 
Converse’s interpretation use theories from social and cognitive psychology to understand how 
and why citizens can “make do,” even if they do have the low-levels of knowledge that Converse 
uncovered in his original study. The ability to “make do” with incomplete information comes 
from the idea that citizens can use cues to behave as if they were more informed than they 
actually are. The concept of using cues to make political judgments in the absence of complete 
knowledge is the central argument of the heuristics literature in political psychology.  
Heuristics: Making Sense of a Complicated World 
Citizens constantly use heuristics to make sense of their political worlds. Heuristics are 
“common judgmental shortcuts that people use to draw complicated inferences from simple 
environmental cues” (Lupia et al., 2000, p. 17). Though the idea of such cues is not new to 
behavioral science (e.g. Berelson et al., 1954; Simon 1955), the explicit incorporation of 
cognitive heuristics into studies of political science is only a few decades old (e.g. Ferejohn & 
Kuklinski, 1990). The integration of this concept has shed considerable light on how citizens use 
cues to better-navigate their political worlds.  
 The heuristics literature has produced several key findings. First, political psychologists 
agree that all citizens use heuristics. The extremely sophisticated policy wonk uses heuristics to 
make inferences about her environment, as does the utterly disengaged citizen. Second, even 
                                                          
28 The only exception was when the political issue affected their everyday lives. Since most political issues do not 
have an easy-to-understand connection to the lives of the average citizen, Converse found that citizens were 
completely ignorant about many political issues.   
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though citizens do not all start from the same baseline in terms of political knowledge and 
political sophistication, heuristics increase the probability of a correct judgement across the 
board. Thus, there is reason to believe that heuristics are doing quite a lot of good, in terms of 
helping citizens find their way through their political worlds.  
 There is also reason to believe that heuristics are not cure-alls. Bartels (1996), Althaus 
(1998), and Gilens (2001) find that citizen’s heuristics-based decision-making and opinions look 
markedly different than they might have looked, had the citizen been fully-informed. Moreover, 
low-levels of information have real political consequences that cannot be cured by the use of 
cognitive shortcuts (Bartels 1996); even though heuristics can enable citizens to make well-
reasoned inferences in the absence of full information, these inferences cannot replace the power 
of full information.29  
The American Electorate’s Perceptions of their Political Representatives 
In some domains, heuristics appear to work to the citizen’s advantage. For example, 
heuristics enable citizens to make inferences about their political representatives. For example, 
Alvarez and Gronke (1996) found when citizens could not remember, or had never learned, how 
their representative voted on salient issues, many citizens were able to surmise how their 
representative behaved through context clues.30 Heuristics should also enable citizens to see the 
reality of their representative’s political ideology. Despite the relatively low-levels of political 
                                                          
29As Mondak (1993) notes, cognitive deliberation can yield political judgments that are socially undesirable 
(Kuklinski et al., 1991). Further, introspection can cause people to behave more differently than “experts” than those 
who did not engage in introspection (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
30 These findings provide an answer to polls that find that only a third of registered voters can name the three 
branches of government, and only 20 percent can name the current chief justice. Because heuristics can and do 
enable American citizens to make accurate political judgments, the assertions that the low levels of political 
knowledge are a bellwether for a “vacuous” public opinion are exaggerated (Mondak 1993). Separately, non-
respond on open-ended survey items cannot be automatically attributed to low-levels of political knowledge. For 
example, an apathetic subject might refuse to answer, giving the illusion of ignorance; a disagreeable respondent 
might refuse to answer, for personality reasons (Mondak 2001; Mondak & Davis 2001). 
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knowledge in the American electorate, citizens usually do a good job of accurately perceiving 
their representative’s political ideology. Citizens are able to do this through the use of cue-
taking. Partisan stereotypes, for example, can increase the accuracy of citizens’ perceptions of 
their representative’s ideology (Koch 2002). 
Heuristics should work to the citizen’s advantage when it comes to seeing the reality of 
their Black representative’s political ideology. In the United States, nearly every black politician 
is a liberal Democrat, with few exceptions (Lublin 1999). If every prominent black 
representative that the citizen can think of is a liberal and/or a Democrat, then the person can 
infer from that, and will often have it right. The long-standing connections between black voters 
and the Democratic party should reinforce this stereotype that Blacks are liberals and Democrats, 
though, as my previous chapters demonstrate, Blacks are more ideologically heterogeneous than 
their partisan identity or voting behavior suggests. In short, because of the accessibility of the 
“Black = liberal” heuristic, citizens should be quite adept at seeing the reality of their black 
representative’s political ideology.  
By comparison, Latino representatives are far less numerous than Black representatives, 
and citizens may not have immediately-accessible information at hand about Latino 
representatives. Moreover, there are no long-standing connections between Latino voters and any 
one political party, so citizens may not be able to rely upon those stereotypes, either. Because 
citizens have fewer examples to call upon with regard to Latino ideology, they should be less 
adept at seeing the reality of their Latino representative’s political ideology. In the next section, I 
examine past attempts to clarify how a representative’s ascriptive characteristics can warp 
citizens’ perceptions of the representative’s political ideology. 
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Below, I present the racial and ethnic breakdown of Anglo, Black, and Latino 
representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1976 - 2012 (Figure 4.1). 
Accompanying it, I present box plots for the distribution of Anglo, Black, and Latino 
representatives’ DW-Nominate scores from 1976 - 2012 (Figure 4.2). Together, these figures 
paint a picture about the racial, ethnic, and ideological composition of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. The House is dominated by Anglo representatives, who are much more 
numerous and much more ideologically diverse than the black and Latino representatives. By 
comparison, Black representatives are nearly twice as numerous as Latino representatives, and 
are the most homogeneous. Latino representatives are few, and while they skew liberal, they are 
not nearly as homogeneous as black representatives.  
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Anglo, Black, and Latino Legislators, U.S. House of Representatives, 











Figure 4.2: Distribution of Political Ideology for Anglo, Black, and Latino Legislators, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1976 - 2012 
 
Past Research on Race-Based Perceptions of Political Representatives 
Scholars know that race-based evaluations of political representatives can negatively 
influence both descriptive and substantive representation in American political institutions. 
Politically sophisticated Anglos are less likely to vote Democrat when the candidate is black; 
meanwhile, candidate race has no effect on the vote choice of politically unsophisticated Anglo 
voters (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). For citizens with racial biases, knowledge empowers them 
to express these racial biases with their political choices.31 
 Scholars also know that race can cause misperceptions of political representatives. It is 
one thing for citizens to have lower affect for minority candidates than for Anglo candidates. It is 
quite another for race to interfere with citizens’ ability to see the reality of their representatives. 
Jacobsmeier (2014; 2015) finds that race-based misperceptions lead Anglo voters to misperceive 
                                                          
31Matsubayashi and Ueda's results echo the results of Federico's (2004) study on the paradoxical effects of education 
and welfare policies. Though education usually reduces Caucasians' racial hostility, education enables Caucasians to 
better-connect their racial attitudes with their policy preferences. 
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Black candidates as more liberal than their issue-positions would warrant. This misperception 
artificially inflates the perceived ideological distance between the citizen and the candidate, 
warping the voter’s perceptions of how to maximize their utility by voting for the candidate who 
is ideologically closest (Downs 1957).  
Consequences of Misperceptions of Political Representatives  
Because heuristics enable citizens to approximate their representative’s political ideology, or 
make inferences about the representative’s policy positions, citizens are able to vote for the 
candidate with whom they perceive the most ideological closeness (Downs 1957). When citizens 
are selecting the candidate with whom they are most ideologically close, they are engaging in 
“correct voting” – that is, the citizen is making the best choice based on their individual values 
and beliefs (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997).  
American political institutions, while far from perfectly representative, have seen an 
increase in diversity over the last few decades. Currently, 45 black politicians, as well as a record 
number of women and Latinos, are serving in the United States Congress. When citizens are 
unable to accurately perceive their representative’s ideology, this undermines both substantive 
and descriptive representation in American institutions.  
If a candidate’s ascriptive characteristics interfere with a citizen’s ability to accurately 
perceive her representative, this could systematically disadvantage minority candidates in myriad 
ways. First, if minority candidates are perceived as ideologically extreme, citizens could perceive 
their opponents as ideologically close, and choose to vote for the opposition candidate. Given 
what scholars know about stereotype activation in campaigns (e.g. Bauer 2015), opposition to 
minority candidates could use racial frames could win elections. Indeed, there is evidence that 
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such implicit racial messages have been used in campaigns before, with considerable success 
(Mendelberg 2001).   
Race-based misperceptions could also depress voter turnout among Democrats. For 
example, a moderate or more-centrist Democrat could correctly perceive the Republican 
candidate as being ideologically distant. But she could also misperceive the minority Democratic 
candidate as being ideologically distant as well. These perceptions – and misperceptions – could 
leave the citizen feeling dissatisfied with all of her options, to the point that the citizen may not 
turn out to vote at all. The “best case” scenario results in the citizen feeling disgruntled with her 
representative, due to perceptions of ideological extremity, however inaccurate these perceptions 
may be. The “worst case” scenario is low voter turnout, and disengagement with politics.  
Race-based misperceptions of minority candidates may also reduce pressure on Anglo 
competitors. A Latino candidate could be ideologically closer to the plurality of her district, and 
still lose. Knowing this, an Anglo candidate might not be sufficiently motivated to be 
substantively representative of the constituents in that district, or to garner their support. Given 
that Congress is the “government’s most representative body” and is “charged with reconciling 
[Americans’] many points of view,” this threat to substantive representation undermines the very 
purpose of this branch of government (Hamilton 2004, p. 3).  
The increasing diversity of the most representative branch of government means that it is 
crucial for scholars to understand how a representative’s ascriptive characteristics can influence a 
citizen’s perceptions of the representative’s ideology. Specifically, I focus on and compare 
citizens’ perceptions of Anglo, Black, and Latino representatives’ political ideology.  
The Black-White Divide in American Politics 
 Jacobsmeier’s study was a breakthrough for non-experimental research on how voters 
 
87 
perceive their representatives. His research sifts through the messiness of real-world legislative 
processes to identify the continued centrality of race in American politics (Valentino & 
Hutchings, 2004). As important as Jacobsmeier’s study was, it limits itself to the study of Anglo 
and black incumbents in the U.S. House of representatives. It is not unusual in this regard. The 
effect of race on American elections has mostly been confined to studies of black politicians, by 
comparing them to the “baseline” set by Anglo politicians.  
Indeed, much of the study of race in American politics focuses on the historic cleavage 
between Anglos and Blacks. The bulk of this research focuses on Anglos’ animus toward Blacks 
(e.g. Bobo et al. 1997; Devine 1989; Redlawsk et al. 2010; Sidanius et al. 2000), as well as Black 
Americans’ struggle for substantive and descriptive representation (Swain 1993; Tate 2003). 
Understanding Anglos’ attitudes toward Blacks is crucial to the understanding of American 
politics. Anglos comprise the plurality of voters in the United States (Census Bureau Report, 
2013). Furthermore, racial gerrymandering has limited the political power of minority voters, 
while maintaining or increasing the power of Anglo voters (e.g. Lublin 1997; Hajnal et al. 2017). 
Understanding how Anglos respond to Black candidates, as well as candidates who appeal to 
Black interests, helps explain many electoral outcomes in the United States. 
That said, understanding how Anglos respond to Blacks does not mean that scholars have 
a complete understanding of race and ethnic politics in the United States. It only means that we 
know how one subgroup responds to another subgroup. Scholars do not yet understand how the 
mechanism by which Anglos respond to one outgroup (Black Americans) might not hold in 
describing how Anglos respond to a different outgroup (Latinos). Further, scholars do not know 
how accurately constituents perceive their Latino representatives, or how these perceptions 
advantage or disadvantage their electoral chances.  
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Scholars have a general idea of how citizens use – and misuse – heuristics. Due to Black 
Americans’ long-standing and salient connection to the Democratic party, voters use easily-
accessible race-based partisan stereotypes to perceive their African-American representatives. 
But what happens when there is not a highly-salient race-based partisan stereotype? I seek to 
answer this question by examining how Latino representatives are perceived by their 
constituents. Specifically, I seek to understand how constituents perceive their Latino 
representative’s political ideology, compared to how constituents perceive their Black and Anglo 
representatives.  
While there is a salient race-based partisan heuristic for Black politicians, the partisan 
connection for Latinos has been more heterogeneous. Country of ethnic origin is a powerful 
predictor of Latino partisanship (DeSipio 1998). Cuban Americans tend to vote for  Republican 
politicians (Grenier et al. 1994), while Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans usually vote for 
Democrats (Alvarez & Bedolla 2003).32 The rates at which these subgroups vote for the party of 
their choice are quite stable (Alvarez & Bedolla 2003). 
 Thus, Blacks have a fairly simple – and highly salient – story about partisanship and 
group ideology. But Latinos have a much more complex story. Not only is there greater 
ideological heterogeneity, but also there is greater partisan and ideological lability at the 
individual level. There is no clear and easily-accessible heuristic about Latinos group ideology. 
Because the overwhelming majority of Americans have low-levels of political knowledge, they 
need these context clues to make political judgments. Because there are not clear, salient cues for 
Latino group ideology, I expect for constituents to be less adept at seeing the reality of their 
                                                          
32 DeSipio (1996) notes that “as with all populations, class plays an important role in Latino partisanship. Affluent 
Mexican Americans are more likely than their poor coethnics to be Republican (Brischetto 1987). The Cuban 
community shows some partisan diversity as well, although it is less pronounced than among the Mexican 





Like Jacobsmeier (2014; 2015), I test my hypotheses using survey data from the American 
National Election Study (ANES) from 1978 to 2012 The ANES is a biennial national survey that 
asks respondents about their demographic attributes, their political attitudes, and their political 
behavior. I pooled these constituent-level survey data with data about the citizen’s incumbent 
representative in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
For data on the House representative, I first used Poole-Rosenthal’s first dimension DW-
Nominate scores from 1976 to 2010 (Poole & Rosenthal 1985).33 The Poole-Rosenthal first 
dimension DW-Nominate scores use roll call votes to identify the representative’s political 
ideology on an economic dimension.34 I pooled these data with Sulkin’s House Contextual data 
from the 101st – 109th Congress. These data track the representative’s ascriptive characteristics. 
Finally, I included original data that I gathered on the ascriptive characteristics of the 
representatives in the 95 – 100th Congress.  
I use these data to test the following hypotheses:  
H1: Constituents will be able to connect the reality of their black representative’s political 
ideology to perceptions of their black representative’s political ideology.  
                                                          
33 From 1978 to 2004, the ANES asked respondents to place their district's U.S. House incumbents on a 7-point 
ideological scale. This question is retrospective, asking them to evaluate a candidate who is already in office. Thus, I 
pool these survey data with data about the House members that were elected during the previous Congressional 
election. Based on Jacobsmeier’s description of his methodology, it is not clear to me whether he did this or not.  
34 DW-Nominate scores are often used as a measurement for a representative’s ideology. In my dissertation, I treat 
them as a proxy for the incumbent House representative’s ideology. DW-Nominate scores do not indicate the 
representative’s ideology within a fixed system. The score does not represent how she compares to other 
representatives in past Congresses. Nor does it compare all representatives, of all Congresses, against a fixed scope 
of ideology. Instead, DW-Nominate scores compare a single representative’s votes to how the rest of that session of 
Congress voted, and how party leadership voted. Thus, DW-Nominate scores are not so much measures of ideology, 




H2: Constituents will be less-able to connect the reality of their Latino representative’s political 
ideology to their perceptions of their Latino representative’s political ideology. 
Dependent Variable  
I am interested in the respondent’s perception of the incumbent’s political ideology. I am 
interested in whether race and ethnicity – both of the constituent and of the incumbent – 
condition how citizens perceive their representative’s political ideology. Specifically, I am 
interested in how race and ethnicity influences the ability of citizens to connect their perceptions 
of the representative’s ideology to the reality of their incumbent’s ideology. Accountability – a 
critical democratic principle – requires at a minimum, that citizens are able to evaluate their 
incumbent’s performance accurately. If a citizen is unable to evaluate her representative, then 
she is unable to hold her representative accountable, undermining American democracy.  
Independent Variables 
My first independent variable is the candidate’s DW-Nominate score. A positive, statistically 
significant coefficient for the DW-Nominate variable means that citizens are able, on average, to 
perceive their representative’s political ideology with some level of accuracy. In a 
democratically ideal situation, the DW-Nominate score should be the only predictor of 
perceptions of a representative’s ideology. That is, neither the citizen’s race and ethnicity, nor 
the representative’s race and ethnicity, should warp perceptions of the representative’s political 
ideology. However, because past research suggests that this is not the case, I include the citizens’ 
race and ethnicity (Anglo, Black, and Latino) as predictors of perceptions of representative 





Descriptive Statistics  
I present the descriptive statistics for the constituents in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (n=33,133), and the 
descriptive statistics for the representatives in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Constituents – Continuous and Ordinal Variables 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. N 
Education35 1 4 3 2.65 0.95 33,133 
Party Identification36 1 7 3 3.61 2.07 33,133 
Political Ideology37 1 7 4 4.24 1.41 24,271 
Age  18 99 44 46.11 17.83 33,133 
Perceptions of Incumbent 
Ideology38 
1 7 4 4.22 1.43 8,72339 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Constituents – Dichotomous Variables  
Variables Yes No 
Race / Ethnicity   
Anglo 24,173 7664 
Black 4,487 27,350 
Latino 3,177 28,660 
Gender   
Female 18, 212 14,921 
Male 14, 921 18,212 
 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Representatives – Continuous and Ordinal Variables 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. N 
DW-Nominate Score -.751 1.36 -0.1 0.04 0.45 8,226 
 
                                                          
35For education, 1 = 0 – 8 grades, 2 = 12 grades or fewer, 3 = 13 grades or more, but no degree, and 4 = college 
degree or more.  
36 For party identification, 1= strong democrat, 2 = weak democrat, 3 = independent, but leans Democrat, 4 = 
independent with no lean toward either party, 5 = independent but leans Republican, 6 = weak Republican, and 7 = 
strong republican.  
37 For political ideology, 1 = extremely liberal, 2 = liberal, 3 = somewhat liberal, 4 = moderate, 5 = somewhat 
conservative, 6 = conservative, 7 = extremely conservative.  
38 For perceptions of incumbent ideology, 1 = extremely liberal, 2 = liberal, 3 = somewhat liberal, 4 = moderate, 5 = 
somewhat conservative, 6 = conservative, 7 = extremely conservative. 
39 Of the 31,133 respondents in my dataset, only 16,774 were asked about their perceptions of their representative’s 
ideology. Of the respondents who were asked, 3,447 respondents (21%) did not have an incumbent who was running 
for re-election, and were ineligible to answer the question. An additional 3,985 (24%) did not recognize their 
representative and did not weigh in. 619 respondents refused to answer. The remaining 8,723 respondents provided 
responses to the question. In short, about 65% of respondents who a) were asked the question and b) were eligible to 
answer the question could provide an answer to the question. I include the over-time racial and ethnic breakdown of 
eligible respondents who reported their perceptions of their incumbent’s ideology in the appendix. 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for Representatives – Dichotomous Variables  
Variables Yes No 
Race / Ethnicity   
Anglo 7,264 962 
Black 575 7,651 
Latino 312 7,914 
Gender   
Female 861 7.365 
Male 7,365 861 
Political Party   
Democrat 4,458 3,768 
Republican 3,758 4,468 
Independent 10 8,216 
 
Results 
I examined how race and ethnicity influence respondents’ perceptions of their incumbent’s 
political ideology. Table 4.5 examines the predictors of perceived ideology for Anglo 
incumbents. Table 4.6 examines the predictors of perceived ideology for black incumbents, 
while Table 4.7 examines the predictors of ideology for Latino incumbents. To account for the 
pooled structure, I use clustered robust standard errors for the ANES year.  
I first broke apart incumbents by race, and examined the predictors of perceptions of the 
incumbent’s political ideology. I found that the DW-Nominate score was a statistically 
significant predictor of perceptions of the Anglo incumbent’s political ideology (Table 4.5). This 
result suggests that Anglo and Latino respondents were generally able to connect the reality of 
their respondent’s ideology to their perceptions of the respondent’s ideology. However, I found 
that black respondents were somewhat less adept at correctly perceiving their Anglo 
representative’s political ideology (p<.01). In Figure 4.3, I graphed how Anglos, Blacks, and 
Latinos connected their perceptions of their Anglo incumbents to the reality of their Anglo 
incumbents. In keeping with Table 4.5 Anglos are able to see the reality of their Anglo 
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incumbent’s political ideology, while Latinos and Blacks are less able to accurately perceive 
their Anglo representative’s political ideology. 
Table 4.5: Citizens’ Perceptions of Anglo Incumbents, 1978 – 2014 
 Coefficient (std. errors) 
Constant 4.18 *** 
(0.04) 
DW-Nominate 1.51 *** 
(0.07) 
Black voter -0.48 
(0.06) 
Latino voter 0.04 
(0.05) 
Black voter X DW-Nominate -0.97 ** 
(0.25) 
Latino voter X DW-Nominate -0.41 #  
(0.19) 
N 7946 
Adj. R^2 0.17 










Next, I found that citizens were able to perceive their black representatives accurately, 
though Latinos were somewhat less able to see the accuracy of their black representative’s 
political ideology (Table 4.6). When I graphed Anglos’, blacks’, and Latinos’ ability to 
accurately perceive their representative’s ideology, the difference is even more striking. Blacks 
and Anglos generally get it right when it comes to seeing the reality of their black incumbents, 
but Latinos struggle to accurately perceive their representative’s ideology. 
Table 4.6: Citizens’ Perceptions of Black Incumbents, 1978 – 2014 
 Coefficient (std. errors) 
Constant 4.25 *** 
(0.27) 
DW-Nominate 2.61 *** 
(0.45) 
Black voter 0.49 
(0.49) 
Latino voter -1.33 
(0.88) 
Black voter X DW-Nominate -0.57 
(0.88) 
Latino voter X DW-Nominate -4.08 # 
(1.85) 
N 531 
Adj. R^2 0.07 






Figure 4.4: Citizens’ Perceptions of Black Incumbents, 1978 – 2014 
 
 
Finally, I found that Latino representatives were perceived accurately by their Anglo 
constituents, but that their Latino constituents were not able to see the reality of their 
representative’s political ideology (Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5). I also found that Blacks’ 
perceptions of their Latino representatives consistently skewed more conservative than Latino or 
Anglo perceptions of the same representative. In sum, constituents are able to see the reality of 
 
97 
their black representative’s ideology. By comparison, citizens’ perceptions of Anglo incumbents 
and Latino incumbents are less accurate. These results suggest that race and ethnicity do warp 
perceptions of representatives’ political ideology, though not in the same manner that previous 
research suggests.  
 
Table 4.7: Citizens’ Perceptions of Latino Incumbents, 1978 – 2014 
 Coefficient (std. errors) 
Constant 4.09 *** 
(0.18) 
DW-Nominate 1.44 ** 
(0.4) 
Black voter 1.04 * 
(0.3) 
Latino voter 0.18 
(0.25) 
Black voter X DW-Nominate 1.32  
(0.64) 
Latino voter X DW-Nominate -1.36 * 
(0.54) 
N 248 
Adj. R^2 0.06 























Figure 4.5: Citizens’ Perceptions of Latino Incumbents, 1978 – 2014 
 
In order to understand what Latinos are seeing when they perceive their representatives, I break 
apart the dataset by respondent race. I find that Latinos connect their own political ideology to 
the political ideology of their Latino representatives (Table 4.8 and Figure 4.6). By comparison, 





Table 4.8: Latino Respondents’ Perceptions of their Incumbents, 1978 – 2014 
 Coefficient (std. errors) 
DW-Nominate 1.36 *** 
(0.21) 
Black MOC -4.4 ** 
(1.1) 
Latino MOC -1.78 # 
(0.83) 
Black representative X DW-Nominate -6.58 ** 
(1.94) 
Latino representative X DW-Nominate -1.36 #  
(0.66)  
Respondent’s ideology -0.04 
(0.4) 
Black MOC X respondent ideology 0.26 
(0.15) 
Latino MOC X respondent ideology  0.42 * 
(0.18) 























Past research finds that a representative’s race can warp citizen’s perceptions of the 
representative’s political ideology. Specifically, Jacobsmeier (2014; 2015) found that Anglo 
citizens perceived black representatives to be more liberal than the representative’s issue 
positions would warrant. I offer a more upbeat perspective on citizen competence, and argue that 
the salience of black Americans’ connections to the Democratic party should mean that citizens 
should be able to perceive the reality of their black representative’s ideology with remarkable 
competence. Conversely, I argued that the lack of a clear, salient connection to a political 
ideology or to a political party should mean that constituents should have more difficulty seeing 
the reality of their Latino representative’s political ideology.  
In keeping with my theory, my results ran counter to Jacobsmeier’s original results; I 
found that all Anglo and Black constituents were generally able to see the reality of their Anglo 
and Black representatives; by comparison, Latino constituents struggled to see the reality of their 
black representative’s ideology. While Blacks and Anglos were generally able to see the reality 
of the Latino representative’s political ideology, Black constituents’ perceptions of Latino 
representatives skewed more conservative than Anglos’ or Latinos’ perceptions of the 
representative. Separately, Latinos were unable to accurately perceive their Latino 
representative’s ideology. Instead, I found that Latino constituents “projected” their own 
ideology onto the ideology of their Latino representative – a phenomenon that did not occur for 
Latinos with Anglo or black representatives.  
My results have their limitations. I do not account for how legislative behavior might 
distort perceptions of incumbent ideology. For example, I do not explore how legislative 
inactivity might cause a constituent to perceive her representative as more ideologically distant 
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from her. I also do not account for how the intersection of gender and race might change these 
results. For example, I do not explore how women of color might be perceived as more liberal 
than Anglo women, or among which subgroups these misperceptions might occur.  Including 
these pieces of the puzzle should add nuance to my results, and I intend to explore this nuance in 
my future research.  
Normatively, my results are a mixed bag. On one hand, constituents do not systematically 
misperceive their black representatives. Anglo voters dominate the American electorate. And 
though the American electorate is diversifying, it will be some time before it reaches majority-
minority status. The fact that Anglo voters were generally able to see the reality of their 
representatives is encouraging, if only because it means that the bulk of the American electorate 
is able to correctly perceive their representatives. On the other hand, race and ethnicity do warp 
constituent’s perceptions of their representatives.  
Specifically, this warped misperception appears to harm Latino representatives, who are 
more likely to emerge from minority-majority districts.40 Black constituents systematically 
perceive their Latino representatives as conservative, while Latino constituents are unable to see 
the reality of their representative’s ideology. Though Latino constituents project their own 
ideology onto their Latino representatives, it is not clear whether this projection results in greater 




                                                          
40I discuss my plans for estimating the scope of the harm (e.g. elections lost) in the concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Citizens’ Perceptions of Anglo, Black, and Latino Candidates 
Introduction  
Chapter 2 established that the connection between a citizen’s ideology and the person’s partisan 
identity varied across subgroups. Specifically, the connection shows up in the aggregate because 
Anglos make this connection, and most surveys are majority-Anglo respondents.  I demonstrate 
that this connection is much weaker for Blacks and Latinos. Nevertheless, due to the long-
standing connection between Black Americans and the Democratic party, citizens have an easy, 
accessible heuristic for Black voting behavior and Black group ideology – that is, Anglos should 
perceive that Blacks are overwhelmingly liberal, even though Blacks are ideologically diverse. 
By comparison, there is no clear, salient cue about Latino voting behavior or about Latino 
group ideology; thus, the American electorate’s perceptions of Latino group ideology should be 
more malleable and more susceptible to primes. In Chapter 3, I find that the Anglo-dominated 
subject pool saw Blacks and Latinos as quite liberal. I also found that while the malleability of 
perceptions of Black group ideology was conditioned on the content of the prime, perceptions of 
Latino group ideology are malleable, irrespective of the content of the prime. So while citizens 
can and do resist certain sorts of messages about Blacks, they are more susceptible to messages 
about Latinos.  
Together, the chapters’ findings suggest that because of the long-standing connection 
between the Democratic Party and Blacks, citizens are used to the idea of a clear, salient cue for 
group ideology for Black group ideology, however misguided this cue may be. However, the 
cognitive connections between Blacks and liberalism was the result of Black Americans’ long-
standing alliance with the Democratic Party.41 Unlike Blacks, Latinos have no such long-
                                                          
41 Thought the connection to the Democratic Party strengthened during the Civil Rights movement, this alliance 
existed long before the 1960s. Since the mid-1930s, Black Americans have never cast more than 40% of the vote for 
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standing alliance to an American political party, due in part to the lack of institutional forces that 
motivated Black Americans' alliance to the Democratic Party. Because citizens are able to rely 
upon the cue of “Black = liberal” to navigate new information about Black group ideology, they 
are able to resist certain sort of messaging. But because citizens don’t have similar cues for 
Latinos, they are more susceptible to messaging about Latinos.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the consequences of this lack of a clear, salient cue on how the 
American electorate perceives the Latino representatives and candidates. Chapter 4 employed 
real-world observational data to examine how a citizen's race / ethnicity, and ideology conditions 
the relationship between a) a representative's race / ethnicity, and (b) citizens' perceptions of that 
representative's ideology. I find that Anglos and Blacks are able to see the reality of their Black 
and Latino representative’s political ideology, but that Latinos struggled in this regard. I 
discovered that Latino citizens are “projecting” their own political ideology onto the ideology of 
their Latino representatives, which uniquely warps the citizen’s ability to see the reality of their 
representative.  
Chapter 5 supplements the previous chapter's findings with experimental data on how a 
candidate's race or ethnicity influences citizens' approval of candidates, perceptions of the 
candidate's ideology, and perceptions of ideological distance from the candidate. In my analyses, 
I find that a candidate’s race and ethnicity do not influence a subject’s perceptions of that 
candidate’s ideology, perceptions of ideological distance from that candidate, or favorability 
toward that candidate. Instead, I find that general tendencies for perceptions of closeness with 
candidates, or general favorability toward candidates, is the foremost determinant of how 
candidates responded to the candidate in question. This finding, as well as the inclusion of Latino 
                                                          
a Republican candidate (Bump 2015). 
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candidates in the experimental conditions, adds important nuance to the study of race and 
perceptions of political representatives.  
The Puzzle 
Much ink has been spilled on Anglos’ animus toward black citizens and black representatives, on 
the basis of race. Thus far, the study of how race conditions support for candidates has been 
inconclusive (Valentino et al., 2004). Critically, the attempt to disentangle ideology from race 
has proven especially challenging. Because black voters and black representatives are 
overwhelmingly Democrats, it is reasonable that citizens infer that black candidates are more 
liberal than Anglo candidates (e.g. McDermott 1998), and that if elected, black candidates would 
support more liberal policies.  
It is true that black representatives are overwhelmingly liberal, and should pursue liberal 
policies once in office; however, it is when black representatives are misperceived as more 
liberal than their issue positions would warrant, or when black candidates are perceived as more 
liberal than an identical Anglo candidate that we start to run into trouble. In an attempt to 
maximize their utility, citizens should vote for candidates with whom they perceive the most 
ideological similarity (Downs 1957). While past research finds that citizens misperceive black 
representatives (Jacobsmeier 2014; Jacobsmeier 2015), in my previous chapter, I found that 
citizens are generally very good at seeing the reality of their incumbent black representative’s 
ideology, and should be able to use these perceptions to inform how to best maximize their 
utility. Thus, the jury is very much out on the relationship between race and perceptions of 
representative ideology.  
If our understanding of candidate race and perceptions of ideology is inconclusive for 
black candidates, it is virtually nonexistent for Latino candidates. The previous chapters have 
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found that citizens’ perceptions of Latino voters are quite pliable, and that citizens had a difficult 
time nailing down the reality of their Latino representative’s political ideology. But these 
findings do not shed insight into Anglos’ perceptions of  Latino candidates’ ideology in low-
information environments, or how these perceptions of Latino candidates compare to identical 
Anglo and Black candidates.  
A central question to this dissertation is whether race and ethnicity warp citizens’ 
perceptions of their representatives. Addressing how race and ethnicity play into perceptions of 
candidate ideology will improve scholarly understanding of connections between ethnicity and 
matters fundamental to descriptive representation. In this chapter, I attempt to shed light on our 
understanding of how race and ethnicity, with all else held equal, can influence citizens’ 
perceptions of a candidate’s ideology, perceived ideological distance from that candidate, and 
approval for the candidate. Specifically, I wish to clarify whether the same mechanisms guide 
how Anglos perceive black and Latino candidates, or whether black and Latino candidates face 
entirely different challenges when it comes to garnering support from the Anglo-dominated 
electorate. 
Benefits of Using a Jury Pool as an Experimental Subject Pool  
Student subject pools have long been the bread and butter of social scientific research. These 
pools are a low-cost convenience sample, making them attractive to researchers interested in 
conducting experiments. However, scholars disagree over the generalizability of results from 
such a homogeneous population to the country at large, or, indeed, from Western university 
students to non-Westerners (see Henrich et al. 2010).42 
                                                          
42Sears (1986) argues that the differences between college students and the population at large means that the results 
of such studies are biased, and that these biases can undermine the reliability of the researchers’ conclusions. For 
example, he argues that college students’ attitudes are more changeable, that their sense of self is more unstable, that 
they are more likely to be cognitively high-functioning and more eager to conform. He argues that these differences 
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There is one thing that nearly all scholars can agree upon – if a researcher interested in 
generalizing her findings to the population at large, a more diverse sample is preferred to a less 
diverse sample. Though diversity is not the same as representativeness (see Murray et al., 2013), 
there are advantages to diverse samples. First, heterogeneous samples offer a greater likelihood 
of external validity than homogeneous samples. Second, diverse samples offer more 
opportunities to examine heterogeneity in treatment effects (see Druckman and Kam, 2011). 
Because of these advantages, creating an experimental subject pool from citizens 
appearing for jury duty is appealing. By law, these jury pools must be diverse (Duran v. 
Missouri, 1979). In theory, this legal requirement for diversity should yield the aforementioned 
advantages of a diverse sample – an increased likelihood of external validity, and an opportunity 
to study heterogeneous treatment effects.  Moreover, response rates are higher among jurors than 
the public at large (Sigelman et al., 1992). In sum, the aforementioned benefits, as well as the 
uptick in the use of jury pool samples in social science research, suggest that such samples will 
become more and more commonplace (Murray et al., 2013).  
Data  
I use experimental data from 19 randomly selected jury pools from across the United States. In 
the pretest, subjects are presented with a standard battery of questions. Subjects are asked about 
their sex, age, marital status, education levels, race / ethnicity, partisanship, ideology, political 
knowledge, and approval of then-president George W. Bush. Subjects are also given a battery of 
personality questions. For a more in-depth look at the wording and the scales for these questions, 
see Appendix C.   
                                                          
between college students and the population at large mean that social science research paints public opinion as more 
malleable than it really is, and citizens as more thoughtful than they usually are.  
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Subjects then are asked to read five politician’s brief profiles (see Appendix C). After 
reading the profiles, subjects are asked to evaluate all five politicians. Subjects were asked to rate 
how favorably they felt toward each candidate and the perceived ideology of the candidate. 
Finally, subjects were asked how many of the five candidates would be acceptable.   
Two pieces of information are experimentally manipulated (see Figure 5.1). A third of 
subjects read the profiles of five Caucasian politicians, while another third read the profiles of 
four Caucasian politicians and an African-American candidate. The final third of subjects read 
the profiles of four Caucasian politicians and a Latino politician.43 A second manipulation varied 
the level of the election; half of the candidates were running for election to the U.S. House, 




                                                          
43The name “Alex Sandoval” did not change across treatment conditions. 
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Figure 5.1: Experimental Conditions for Jury Pool Experiment 
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This research design mimics the reality of diversity in American electoral politics. The modal 
American representative is an Anglo male (Marcos 2016), and thus minority politicians are 
inevitably compared against this "baseline". In this way, the experimental design has more 
external validity than if I were to merely ask subjects to evaluate minority politicians. Because 
choice of candidates is inherent in democracy, evaluating a suite of candidates is much closer to 
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reality than evaluating each candidate piecemeal. This choice set could also match to a typical 
open-seat primary election, or nonpartisan local election.  
Descriptive Statistics 
I present the descriptive statistics for the Anglo participants from the jury pool experiment in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (n = 355). The samples are fairly balanced in terms of education, party 
identification, political ideology, age, and gender identity. This, in combination with the 
representativeness of a jury pool subject pool, makes me confident that I can use my results to 
make inferences about Anglos more generally.  
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Jury Pool Subject Pool – Continuous and Ordinal Variables 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Political Knowledge 0 5 4 3.99 1.2 
Education 1 8 4 4.89 1.66 
Party Identification (1 = Democrat) 1 7 4 4.3 2.24 
Political Ideology (1 = Strongly 
Liberal) 
1 7 4 4.32 1.54 
Age (in 2005) 19 78 48 48.75 12.98 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Jury Pool Subject Pool – Dichotomous Variables  
Variables Yes No 
Female 190 165 
Male 165 190 
 
Perceptions of Sandoval’s Political Ideology 
Using ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression, I first established the predictors of 
perceptions of Sandoval’s political ideology (Table 5.4). Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In my first model, I included variables for the subject’s education, political 
knowledge, political ideology, their average perceptions of other candidates’ ideology, and 
dummy variables for the Sandoval = Black, Sandoval = Latino, and House Election conditions. 
Strikingly, I found that political knowledge was the only statistically significant predictor in the 
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model. The more politically knowledgeable the subject was, the more conservative they thought 
Sandoval was. Meanwhile, subject’s perceptions of Sandoval’s political ideology were wholly 
unconnected to the subject’s average perceptions of the other candidates, and were unconnected 
to Sandoval’s ascriptive characteristics, or the characteristics of the election. This means that on 
average, Sandoval being Black or Latino did not influence subject’s perceptions of his political 
ideology.  
In my second model, I examined whether the prestige of the election conditioned 
perceptions of Sandoval’s political ideology when Sandoval is either Black or Latino. I found 
that irrespective of the prestige of election, Sandoval’s ascriptive characteristics did not influence 
subjects’ perceptions of his political ideology. In my third model, I tested whether the subject’s 
political knowledge conditioned whether Sandoval’s race or ethnicity influenced the subject’s 
perceptions of his political ideology. In doing so, I am examining if higher levels of political 
knowledge influences how citizens perceive Sandoval’s political ideology when Sandoval is 
Black or Latino; I find no such effect. Across all three models, the only statistically significant 
predictor of perceptions of Sandoval’s political ideology was the subject’s political knowledge. 
Low levels of political knowledge meant that the citizen thought Sandoval was more liberal-
leaning or moderate, whereas higher levels of political knowledge meant that the citizen thought 
that Sandoval was more conservative.  
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Sandoval’s Ideology 
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev 





Table 5.4: Perceptions of Sandoval’s Political Ideology 

























































Sandoval = Black X Political 
Knowledge 
  -0.2 
(0.24) 
Sandoval = Latino X Political 
Knowledge 
  -0.03 
(0.24) 






N 304 304 304 
Adjusted R^2 0.08 0.07 0.07 
F-statistic, d.f. 4.5 (7, 296) *** 3.56 (9, 294) *** 2.97 (11,292) *** 
 
Perceptions of Ideological Distance from Sandoval 
Next, I examined perceptions of ideological distance from Sandoval (Table 5.6). I found that the 
biggest determinant of perceptions of ideological distance from Sandoval was the perceptions of 
ideological distance from the other candidates. Put differently, the respondent’s general tendency 
to feel close or distant from candidates was the biggest determinant of how close they felt to 
Sandoval. Furthermore, Sandoval’s ascriptive characteristics did not warp this connection 
between the tendency to feel close or distant from candidates, and their perceptions of 
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ideological closeness with Sandoval. This suggests that subjects did not feel more ideologically 
distant from Sandoval on the basis of his race or ethnicity (Figure 5.2). 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Ideological Distance from Sandoval  
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
0 10 2 2.46 1.91 
 
Table 5.6 - Perceptions of Ideological Distance from Sandoval 
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Avg. Perceptions of Ideological Distance 
From Other Candidates X Sandoval = Black 
 -0.1 
(0.18) 
Avg. Perception of Ideological Distance 








N 304 304 
Adjusted R^2 0.16 0.16 









Figure 5.2: Perceptions of Ideological Distance from Sandoval 
 
 
Favorability for Sandoval 
Next, I explored predictors of a subject’s favorability for Sandoval (Table 5.8). I find that the 
more educated a subject was, the more favorably they felt toward Sandoval. I also found that the 
more conservative a subject was, the more positively they felt toward Sandoval. But the biggest 
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predictor of favorability toward Sandoval was the subject’s general tendency to be favorable 
toward all candidates. Moreover, I find that Sandoval’s ascriptive characteristics did not dampen 
the predictive power of subject’s overall levels of enthusiasm for the candidates (Figure 5.3). 
Table 5.7 – Descriptive Statistics for Favorability Toward Sandoval 
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
0 10 5 5.35 2.04 
 
Table 5.8 – Favorability Toward Sandoval 
 Model 1 Model 2 




























Baseline Favorability X Black Candidate   -0.07 
(0.2) 








N 311 311 
Adjusted R^2 0.14 0.13 


















Number of Acceptable Candidates 
 
Finally, I examined the subject’s perceptions of the number of acceptable candidates (Table 
5.10). If Sandoval’s ascriptive characteristics were to reduce the number of candidates that the 
subject thought was acceptable, then the variable Sandoval = Black or Sandoval = Latino should 
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be negative and statistically significant; I do not find such effects.44 The lack of statistically 
significant variables in my models suggest that the subject’s characteristics, as well as the 
experimental conditions, do not influence the number of candidates that the subject finds to be 
acceptable.  
Table 5.9 – Descriptive Statistics for Number of Acceptable Candidates 
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
0 5 3 3.22 1.32 
 
 
Table 5.10 – Number of Acceptable Candidates 

























Black Candidate X House  -0.04 
(0.35) 
Hispanic Candidate X House  0.34 
(0.38) 




N 303 303 
Adjusted R^2 0.01 0.01 
F-statistic, d.f. 1.71 (6, 296) # 1.42 (8, 294)  
 
 
                                                          




Implications and Conclusion 
Scholars know a lot already about how Anglos perceive Latino representatives, but very 
little about how Anglos perceive Latino candidates, or whether Latino candidates face the same 
hurdles to election as black candidates. It is thus imperative for scholars and politicians alike to 
understand how Latino candidates are perceived by the Anglo-dominated electorate.45 In this 
chapter, I find that in low-information environments, subjects did not perceive black and Latino 
candidates as more ideologically extreme than the identical Anglo candidate, nor were subjects 
less favorable toward a black or Latino candidate. Instead, I found that a subject’s general 
perceptions of ideological distance between themselves and candidates drove perceptions of 
ideological distance between themselves and the fourth candidate, irrespective of the candidate’s 
race or ethnicity. Similarly, I found that a subject’s general tendency to be favorable toward 
candidates was the primary predictor of their favorability toward the fourth candidate, and that 
Sandoval’s race or ethnicity did not change the predictive power of this tendency.  
Somewhat separately, I noticed that a subject’s political knowledge was the foremost 
predictor of their perceptions of Sandoval’s political ideology. It could be that because Sandoval 
is associated with small business concerns as an issue focus, that this cued “economic 
conservative” in the minds of the subjects. I expect that if Sandoval had listed his issue focus as 
something more ideologically-neutral, that politically knowledgeable subjects would not have 
been different from their less-knowledgeable counterparts in their perceptions of Sandoval’s 
ideology. Alternatively, if Sandoval focused on racialized issues, I would expect to find that all 
                                                          
45Though the United States should be a majority-minority country sometime within the next hundred years, this does 
not meant that the American electorate will be majority-minority anytime soon, particularly with voter suppression 
of minority voters (Hajnal et al., 2017). 
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subjects would have perceived him as more liberal, but that knowledgeable subjects would have 
been even better equipped to identify the racialized nature of the policy and identify him as 
liberal (e.g. Federico 2004).   
 In majority-Anglo districts, minority candidates must rely on the Anglo electorate. In my 
experiment, race and ethnicity did not appear to influence perceived ideological distance from a 
minority candidate, or support for a minority candidate. However, other experiments have shown 
that Anglo support for minority candidates is volatile, and that Anglo support for a minority 
candidate can drop off much more precipitously than it does for an Anglo candidate (Berinsky et 
al., 2011). While my chapter cannot account for the circumstances under which support for black 
and Latino candidates drops off, it does offer some perspective on the predictors of citizens’ 






















Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Scholars already know the consequences of race when it comes to Anglos’ animus toward 
black citizens and black representatives. Scholars also understand the consequences of race for 
black identity politics, as well as the hurdles for black representatives’ electoral success. My 
dissertation has sought to understand whether race and ethnicity are similarly consequential 
when considering how the American electorate responds to Latino citizens, as well as Latino 
politicians. As it turns out, it is, and understanding how these responses differ from how the 
American electorate responds to black citizens and black representatives helps paint a more 
complete picture of American politics. 
In the following paragraphs, I outline the findings in each of my empirical chapters. I 
then use the findings from the individual chapters to paint a larger picture of how Latino voters 
and Latino representatives are perceived by the rest of the American electorate. Next, I discuss 
some of the limitations of my dissertation, and how I can address these limitations with my 
future research agenda.   
Findings 
Chapter 2 focused on examining how the connections between ideology and partisan identity 
varied across racial and ethnic subgroups. I argued that this connection at the aggregate level was 
largely driven by Anglos, who, due to their majority status and how the majority of them were 
politically socialized, have the luxury of being issue voters and connecting their political 
ideology to their partisan identity. I argued that there was reason to believe that this connection 
would not hold for Blacks or for Latinos. Even though Blacks are ideologically heterogeneous, 
there are institutional, political, and sociological reasons which guide Blacks in voting 
overwhelmingly Democrat. And because Latinos are more likely to be foreign-born or first-
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generation Americans, the assumptions about the ability of a citizen to connect ideology to 
partisanship based on socialization alone do not hold. My results, which are consistent with my 
hypotheses, suggest that Anglos sort into whatever partisan identity their ideology dictates, and 
that higher-levels of education improve their ability to sort.  Irrespective of their ideology, 
Blacks overwhelmingly sort into the Democratic party, and higher levels of education do not 
strengthen the relationship between Black’s political ideology and their partisan identity. I also 
find that while Latinos’ connections between their political ideology and partisan identity is 
weaker than Anglos’, that higher-levels of education improve their ability to make these 
connections. With more later-generation Latinos and with Latinos closing the educational gap 
between themselves and Anglos, it is possible that the Latino party-ideology link will crystallize 
in the future, and that I am observing a phenomenon that is temporary. It follows that scholars 
should be attentive to this possible crystallization in the decades to come.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that black Americans’ long-standing ties to the Democratic party 
sends a clear - if somewhat inaccurate – signal about black group ideology.  By comparison, 
Latino partisanship is much more heterogeneous; there is not a clear, simple cue for Latino group 
ideology. I argue that when cues are simple, clear, and salient, that citizens should be more 
resistant to primes that include countervailing information. By comparison, the lack of a clear, 
salient cue should mean that citizens should be more easily primed. In short, citizens’ 
perceptions of black group ideology should be resistant to information about the changing nature 
of group ideology; meanwhile, citizens’ perceptions of Latino group ideology should be pliable. 
I find that while citizens’ perceptions of Latino group ideology are indeed easily primed, citizens 
who learned that Blacks were becoming more conservative updated their perceptions to be more 
in line with the prime.  
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In Chapter 4, I tested how race and ethnicity conditioned citizens’ ability to accurately 
perceive their representative’s political ideology. I argued that the salience of black 
representative’s connections to the Democratic party should enable citizens to overwhelmingly 
perceive their Black representative’s political ideology accurately. Conversely, I argued that the 
lack of salient cues for Latino ideology should mean that citizens have more difficulty seeing the 
reality of their representative’s ideology. I found that constituents were able perceive their black 
representative’s ideology accurately, but struggled to see the reality of their Latino 
representatives; thus, the evidence is consistent with my hypotheses.   
In my final empirical chapter, I examined the connections between perceived ideological 
closeness with a representative and approval for that representative; I also examined whether this 
mechanism held across different racial and ethnic subgroups. I found that even though black 
subjects did not feel ideologically close to the black representative, they had high approval 
ratings for him. Meanwhile, though Latinos felt ideologically close to their representative, this 
ideological closeness did not engender warmer affect for the representative. Furthermore, I found 
that while an increase in election prestige did not influence approval for in-group representatives, 
it did lead Black and Latino subjects to have cooler affect for the Anglo opponents.  
When considered together, these results suggest that in order to understand how the 
American electorate perceives Latino voters and Latino representatives, scholars cannot merely 
apply the lessons gleaned from the traditional black-Anglo divide in American racial politics. To 
do so would discount the unique way that Latinos relate to their political ideology, how they fit 
in the American political landscape, and how this uniqueness conditions the way the American 




The racial and ethnic composition of the American citizenry are changing substantially. And 
while political scientists already have a clear idea of how Anglos perceive black voters and 
Black representatives, there is not a clear insight into how the American electorate perceives the 
fastest-growing minority group in the country – Latinos. My dissertation not only examines how 
the American electorate perceives Latino citizens, but also examines how the American 
electorate perceives Latino politicians. At the elite level, the number of Latinos in political office 
has steadily increased over the last few decades; my dissertation provides a timely analysis of 
how the American electorate perceives their Latino representatives. These answers provide 
insight into the sorts of hurdles Latino hopefuls might face when seeking elected office. By 
addressing how the American electorate perceives a growing subgroup of citizens, as well as a 
growing subgroup of representatives, my dissertation provides a path for fruitful engagement 
with the reality of the country’s changing demographics.  
Limitations 
My project is not without its fair share of limitations. In the following paragraphs, I 
outline the limitations, explain how they restrict the sorts of substantive claims I am able to 
make. First, scholars know that racial attitudes vary dramatically by region (Key 1949; 
Middleton 1979), and I do not account for the possibility of such variance in my dissertation. For 
example, I might expect to find that constituents in districts or states with low populations of 
Latinos would be even more susceptible to primes about Latino group ideology. I might expect 
to find that constituents in more ideologically extreme districts or states are able to better-
perceive the reality of their Latino counterparts. I do not account for state-by-state variation, and 
thus am unable to comment on how context – such as demographics or aggregate-level ideology 
– might condition the relationships I talk about in this dissertation. Furthermore, because I do not 
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account for region, I do not account for the variation in the reality of Latino group ideology 
within that region, and how this reality might change how citizens perceive Latino voters. For 
example, a Texan and a Floridian should have different perceptions of Latino voters and Latino 
representatives, but their perceptions of Latino voters and Latino politicians might be accurate 
for their particular environment.   
Second, my dissertation is limited by sample sizes. While my first and third substantive 
chapters draw from large-scale omnibus surveys, and contain thousands of cases, my datasets in 
my second and fourth substantive chapters are much smaller, and much less representative. For 
example, in Chapter 4, I had so few black and Latino respondents that I could not get at their 
perceptions of the various candidates, and had to drop them from my analyses entirely. With a 
larger sample that was similarly representative, I might have been able to include Blacks and 
Latinos in my dataset, and would have been able to examine how their perceptions of the 
candidates differed from the Anglo respondents’ perceptions of the candidate.   
 Third, I am limited by the years during which the data were gathered. For my ANES data, 
I only examine responses from 1978 - 2014. Additionally, while I account for the pooled nature 
of the data statistically, I do not make any substantive comparisons of how responses and 
perceptions change over time. My first experimental chapter uses data gathered in the immediate 
aftermath of a contentious presidential election, during which the Republican presidential 
candidate mishandled Spanish-language communication, and was often openly hostile toward 
Latinos. At the same time, exit polls of the 2016 presidential election showed that one-third of 
male Latino voters and one-quarter of female Latino voters cast their vote for Trump. These 
election results drew much media attention in the weeks following, with pundits expressing 
surprise at the number of Latinos who voted for Trump. In tandem, there was discord between a) 
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then-candidate Trump’s hostility toward Latinos and b) the number of Latino voters who 
supported him. This discord may have made my subjects more easily primed about the changing 
nature of Latino group ideology, because they were unable to make sense of the state of Latino 
group ideology. Without re-running my experiment, it is difficult to say whether or not the 2016 
presidential election may have influenced my results and my substantive interpretations of those 
results.     
My second experimental chapter relies upon a one-shot experiment from 12 years ago, 
making it difficult for me to claim that these results are reflective of how the American electorate 
currently perceives Latino voters and Latino representatives. Moreover, because I do not have 
multiple iterations of experimental data, I am unable to make assertions about how citizens’ 
perceptions of Latino candidates in low-information environments may have changed over time.  
 Next, with the data at hand, I am only able to comment very broadly on perceptions of 
Latino voters and Latino politicians. I am unable to determine whether perceptions of Latino 
voters and Latino politicians is conditioned upon country of ethnic origin. For example, I am 
unable to determine whether there are differences between citizens’ perceptions of Cuban-
American representatives and citizens’ perceptions of Mexican-American representatives. I 
suspect that citizens a) who are highly knowledgeable and b) live in a state with a larger 
population of Latinos should have an easier time seeing the heterogeneity of Latino partisanship 
and ideology, and should have an easier time attributing this heterogeneity to country of ethnic 
origin. I would like to address all of these limitations in future extensions of the project, and add 





Building upon My Dissertation 
One of the main foci of my dissertation has been political socialization. Specifically, I have 
examined how political socialization influences political attitudes, and attachment to political 
ideology among Latinos. Given the relative youth of Latinos, I am interested in the socializing 
effects of the 2016 presidential election. According to a 2014 Pew report, about one-third (17.9 
million) Latinos are under the age of 18. For many of these Latinos, the 2016 election will be a 
formative political event for them. The heightened levels of Latino participation, as well as the 
divisive rhetoric around race, ethnicity, and immigration, should have interesting downstream 
effects for Latino political participation over the next few decades.  
With regard to perceptions of Latino voters, I would like to build upon my findings that 
perceptions of Latino voters are quite pliable. Given this pliability of perceptions, I am interested 
in how willingly the American electorate will respond to messages about forming political 
coalitions with Latinos. Specifically, I am interested in how either positive or negative 
messaging about Latinos might facilitate or interfere with the ability of Latinos to build 
coalitions with other subgroups in American politics. I believe that experimental data could give 
me some leverage on whether pliability of perceptions of Latino group ideology connects to a 
corresponding pliability in willingness to form political coalitions with Latinos.  
Next, I would like to examine the volatility of Anglo support for Latino politicians. Based 
on the lessons from Berinsky et al. (2011), I should expect to find that if political information 
about a Latino candidate implicitly relies on negative stereotypes about Latinos, that Anglo 
support for that politician should drop off precipitously. Savvy opponents will try to gin up 
disapproval for minority candidates through implicit racial messaging. This is precisely what 
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many candidates do (McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011). Because such ads can decrease electoral 
support for the target of these implicit racial ads (Kinder & Sander 1996), Tokeshi and 
Mendelberg (2015) sought to explain how Black candidates can recover from these attacks. They 
find that recovering from such attacks can be difficult, because Anglos do not recognize the 
implicit racial appeals as racist (Mendelberg 2001).  
Along these same lines, I want to examine how Latino candidates can recover from 
appeals that play upon negative stereotypes or associations with Latinos. Like Tokeshi and 
Mendelberg, I would use experimental data to examine how Latino candidates can recover from 
such attacks. I expect to find that when a Latino candidate offers a "credible account" for the 
behavior, that he or she should recover from the attack ad. For example, if the opposition claims 
that the Latino candidate was an "anchor baby," the Latino politician might recover by saying 
that her parents wanted the best thing for her, which was to grow up in the United States. I 
expect that these justifications should help attenuate the effects of the implicit racial messaging, 
though I expect for this attenuation to be conditioned by the citizen's racial resentfulness.  
Next, I would like to examine the conditions under which Latino candidates can earn 
Black and Anglo support. For example, we know that Anglos are more willing to vote for black 
candidates with higher levels of experience, presumably because these candidates buck the 
stereotype of incompetence. I would like to examine if bucking stereotypes of being “outsiders” 
would increase support for Latino politicians. For example, if a Latino politician were a Marine 
with four tours of duty under his belt, would this be an implicit signal to Anglos about being a 
"real American”? Again, I believe that experimental data would give me some leverage on this 
avenue of inquiry. 
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I would also like to examine how race and ethnicity might condition how legislative 
behavior influences citizens’ perceptions of their representative’s ideology. I am especially 
interested in how this moderating effect might work when citizens are primed by stereotypes. For 
example, if a black representative fails to bring money back to the congressional district, or does 
not cosponsor many bills, she may be perceived both more negatively and as more liberal. 
Conversely, similar information about an Anglo representative may influence the citizen’s 
perceptions of the representative’s competence or integrity, but not of the Anglo representative’s 
ideology. For Latino representatives, I would be interested to see whether legislative behavior on 
“outsider” issues – like immigration – or “insider” issues, like the armed forces, would influence 
how citizens perceived them. I would be especially interested in comparing citizens’ perceptions 
of Anglo representatives who were ideologically and behaviorally similar.  
Changing Demographics, Changing Attitudes 
Political science scholars have a sense of how Anglos respond to being outnumbered by non-
Anglos in their localities. A long-standing observation in the race relations literature is that there 
is an inverse relationship between a) Anglo support for racial discrimination, and b) the size of 
the black population, relative to the Anglo population (e.g. Key 1949; Wright 1977; Fossett & 
Kiecolt 1989). Anglo support for racial discrimination stems from a desire to protect their group 
status (Blumer 1958); an increase in minority concentration causes Anglos to feel that their status 
is being threatened, leading to a heightened hostility to blacks and a greater support for racial 
discrimination (Blalock 1967).  
More recently, political science scholars have examined how Anglos respond to the idea 
of a majority-minority country. When primed with this information, apolitical Anglos expressed 
greater support for the Republican Party, as well as more support for conservative policies. 
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Notably, the increase in support for conservative policies included not only racialized policies, 
but race-neutral policies as well (Craig & Richeson 2014). This effect was mediated by 
perceived status loss. Anglos who read a story about the impending majority-minority status of 
the U.S. expressed more politically conservative attitudes and held more politically conservative 
policy preferences than Anglos who read the same story but were assured that this demographic 
shift would not affect their societal status. These findings suggest that the evolving racial 
demographics in the United States may lead to a greater partisan divide, due to a shift in political 
ideology and policy preferences among Anglos. 
However, it is not clear what racial minorities themselves think about this demographic 
shift, or what they think of their growing electoral power. It is equally unclear what specific 
subgroups – such as Latinos and blacks – think about these changes, or how these changes may 
influence these group ideologies. For example, the literature does not specify how Blacks feel 
about this demographic shift, particularly given that this change is coupled with the increase in 
Latino population. If Fossett and Kjecolt's framework holds, blacks should express greater 
hostility toward Latinos and should support more stringent immigration policies. This effect 
should be heightened if blacks perceive that they are competing over scarce resources (Bobo & 
Hutchings 1997; Gay 2006). Past literature finds that the “scarce resources” included job 
competition, housing competition, economic competition, and influence over local politics. It 
follows that competition over substantive or descriptive representation in Congress should also 
heighten blacks’ hostility toward Latinos, undermining a potential political coalition between 
black and Latino voters. Another possible extension of my dissertation project is an exploration 
of what Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos think about these changing demographics, as well as the 
consequences of these attitudes. I expect to find that when these shifting demographics are 
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framed as non-zero-sum changes, Blacks and Latinos will see each other as facing comparable 
struggles for representation, and could be coalition partners (Hurwitz et al., 2015). Conversely, 
when the shifting demographics are framed as zero-sum changes, Blacks and Latinos should see 
the other group as competition for representation in American politics.  
Conclusion 
In sum, my dissertation provides some insight into how the American electorate 
perceives Latino citizens and Latino politicians, and how the Latino group ideology does not 
neatly map onto black-Anglo divide in American political ideology because the assumptions 
about political socialization cannot be as broadly applied to Latinos. I see my dissertation as a 
starting point for the next series of projects, which will tackle further issues of the challenges 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire for Subjects in the University of Illinois Political Science Subject 




1) What is your year in school?  









3) What is your gender identity? 
a) Male 
b) Female 
c) Another identification: [free response] 
 
4) How old were you on your last birthday? [free response] 
 
5) Which racial or ethnic group best describes you?46 
a) African American / Black 
b) Asians 
c) Native American 
d) Hispanic or Latino 
e) Caucasian / White 
f) Other 
g) Don’t Know 
 
6) We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale 
on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from very liberal to very 
conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
a) Very Liberal 
b) Liberal 
c) Somewhat left of center 
d) Centrist, middle of the road 
e) Somewhat right of center 
f) Conservative 
g) Very Conservative 
 
7) Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... 
a) Strong Democrat 
b) Democrat 
                                                          
46Subjects were permitted to select as many categories as were applicable. 
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c) Independent Learning Democracy 
d) Independent 
e) Independent Leaning Republican 
f) Republican 
g) Strong Republican 
 
Political Knowledge Questions (correct answers are bolded) 
Next, we have a set of questions concerning various public figures and current events. Please 
don’t look up the answers before answering each question; we want to see how much 







1) In the map shown above, what does the yellow shaded area represent? State in 2016 that… 
a) had the highest sales tax rates 
b) passed gun control ballot measures 
c) Trump won in the election 







2) Who is the man pictured above? 
a) Chuck Schumer 
b) Joe Manchin 























3) Who is the woman pictured above? 
a) Elizabeth Warren 
b) Barbara Boxer 
c) Kirsten Gillibrand 






4) Who is the man pictured above?  
a) Rush Limbaugh 
b) Scott Walker 
c) Newt Gingrich 





5) What job or political office does this man currently hold? 
a) Speaker of the House 
b) Secretary of State 
c) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
 
6) Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not?  
a) The President 
b) Congress 
c) The Supreme Court 
 
7) Do you happen to know which political party currently has the most members in the U.S. 
House of Representatives in Washington? 
a) Democratic Party 
b) Republican Party 
c) Reform Party 
d) Tea Party 
 
8) Do you happen to know which political party currently has the most members in the U.S. 
Senate in Washington? 
a) Democratic Party 
b) Republican Party 
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c) Reform Party 
d) Tea Party 
 
9) Do you happen to know what the length of a senator’s term is in the U.S. Senate? 
a) 2 years  
b) 4 years 
c) 6 years 
 
10) What percentage of votes are needed in Congress to override a presidential veto? 
a) Three quarters of the House and Senate 
b) Majority of the House and Senate 
c) Three quarters of the House and two thirds of the Senate 
d) Two thirds of the House and three quarters of the Senate 
e) Two thirds of the House and Senate 
 
11)  Which of the following countries has a veto on the U.N. Security Countil? 
a) Brazil 
b) France 













13) Who has been the Prime Minister of Israel since March of 2009? 
a) Ehud Olmert 
b) Tzipi Livni 
c) Benjamin Netanyahu 
d) Ariel Sharon 
 








Appendix B: Baseline Perceptions of Black Group Ideology and Latino Group Ideology 
 
TABLE B.1 Predictors of Perceived Latino and Black Group Ideology, Study 1 
  Perceptions of Latino 
Group Ideology 























N  306 304 
Adjusted R^2  0.04 0.01 
F-statistic, d.f.  5.71 (3, 302) *** 2.14 (3, 300) # 
 
 
Table B.2: Predictors of Perceived Latino and Black Group Ideology Study 2 
 Perceptions of Latino Group 
Ideology 
Perceptions of Black Group 
Ideology 
















N 310 312 
Adjusted R^2 0.02 0.01 












Appendix C: Anglo, Black, and Latino Citizens’ Perceptions of Their Incumbent U.S. 
Representative’s Political Ideology 
 
Table C.1 – Anglo Respondents 
Respondent’s Answer 1978 1980 1982 1986 1990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004 
No incumbent candidate in the district 590 383 485 233 295 283 144 110 156 0 
Extremely liberal 20 11 16 30 16 18 21 14 16 9 
Liberal 73 52 35 86 86 100 59 44 115 57 
Slightly liberal 140 84 71 150 147 134 113 69 92 75 
Moderate; middle of the road 267 189 127 317 258 219 198 140 176 118 
Slightly conservative 167 136 124 228 163 160 189 137 110 101 
Conservative 115 99 105 159 116 165 154 154 163 109 
Extremely conservative 15 11 12 26 29 31 38 23 18 10 
Don’t know; don’t recognize 440 204 200 449 376 245 395 259 318 187 
N/A 2 179 4 8 14 24 12 4 182 0 
 
Table C.2 – Black Respondents  
Respondent’s Answer 1978 1980 1982 1986 1990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004 
No incumbent candidate in the district 130 98 78 63 60 29 31 2 10 0 
Extremely liberal 2 4 4 10 9 3 4 7 5 7 
Liberal 8 8 6 26 14 19 19 8 20 12 
Slightly liberal 14 9 10 23 29 18 17 12 9 15 
Moderate; middle of the road 18 16 11 40 36 30 31 23 15 27 
Slightly conservative 5 9 5 38 25 28 21 17 4 17 
Conservative 5 4 6 24 20 16 10 12 17 11 
Extremely conservative 3 4 6 12 8 7 7 4 3 4 
Don’t know; don’t recognize 30 10 20 77 51 40 50 57 51 29 
N/A 0 21 0 1 1 5 1 0 61 0 
 
Table C.3 – Latino Respondents  
Respondent’s Answer 1978 1980 1982 1986 1990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004 
No incumbent candidate in the district 39 20 21 15 26 16 33 3 6 0 
Extremely liberal 0 0 0 3 3 1 3 3 1 0 
Liberal 2 1 2 3 8 14 5 8 9 4 
Slightly liberal 2 2 1 9 16 15 15 15 7 6 
Moderate; middle of the road 0 8 1 15 28 31 18 20 10 6 
Slightly conservative 2 3 1 12 18 13 9 11 13 7 
Conservative 2 4 1 11 20 13 12 18 8 7 
Extremely conservative 0 0 0 1 7 6 2 7 3 0 
Don’t know; don’t recognize 21 10 11 45 40 35 50 50 40 37 














Appendix D: Demographic Questions and Experimental Conditions in Chapter 5 
Demographics: 
This initial battery includes standard items designed to measure respondents' demographic 
characteristics, long-term political orientations, and levels of political knowledge. Items such as 
these are included on virtually every public opinion survey pertaining to politics and 
government. 
 
1. Sex: Female Male   
 
2. Year of birth: ________ 
 
3. Marital Status: 
 
Single  Married Widowed Divorced Other: ________________ 
 
4. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? 
 
   a. 0-11 Years   d. Some College  g. Master’s degree 
 
b. High school graduate e. College Graduate         h. Professional degree  
                 (J.D., M.D., Ph.D., etc.) 




African-American           Caucasian           Hispanic          Asian          Other: ________________ 
 
6. Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or an  
      independent? (circle one) 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Democrat      Independent     Republican 
 
7. Would you consider yourself to be liberal, conservative, or moderate? (circle one) 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly Liberal                  Moderate    Strongly Conservative      
                                        
8. Here are a few questions about government in Washington. For each, please circle one answer. 
First, who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not? 
 
The president   Congress   The Supreme Court 
 
9. Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts? 
 





10. Which one of the political parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? 
 
Democrats   Republicans 
 
11. How much of a majority is required for the U. S. Senate and House to override a presidential 
veto? 
 
A bare majority (50% + 1) A two-thirds majority  A three-fourths majority 
 
12. What is the main duty of the U.S. Congress? 
 
To write legislation  To administer the  To supervise states’    
      President’s policies            governments 
 
13. To what extent do you approve of the job George Bush is doing as president? 
 




The five candidates below are running for election to (the U.S. House/the county commission). 




















41, has been a high 
school principal for 
9 years. Eberling  
will make education 
his top priority, and 
will encourage 





Gary Gargus, 37, 
is a retired Air 
Force captain. 
Gargus vows to 
develop programs 




M.D., 51, served 
four years as a 
local mayor. 






44, owns six 
local restaurants.  
He is concerned 
with balancing 
regulations with 
the needs of the 
small business 
owner. 
Tim Linder, J.D., 
59, is a former 
asst. district 
attorney. He feels 
judges have too 
much discretion, 
and that sentences 
should be raised 




Samuel 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Eberling Very           Neutral     Very 
                  Unfavorable                Favorable 
 
 
Gary   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Gargus  Very           Neutral     Very 
                  Unfavorable                Favorable 
 
David  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tedrick            Very           Neutral     Very 
                  Unfavorable                Favorable 
 
 
Alex   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sandoval Very           Neutral     Very 
                  Unfavorable                Favorable 
 
 
Tim  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Linder            Very           Neutral     Very 
                  Unfavorable                Favorable 
 
 
2. In your opinion, how liberal or conservative are the candidates? (circle one for each candidate) 
 
Samuel 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Eberling Very           Moderate     Very 
                      Liberal                      Conservative 
 
 
Gary   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Gargus  Very           Moderate     Very 
                      Liberal                      Conservative 
 
David  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tedrick Very           Moderate     Very 
                      Liberal                      Conservative 
 
Alex   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sandoval Very           Moderate     Very 




Tim  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Linder  Very           Moderate     Very 
                      Liberal                      Conservative 
 
 
Alternating photograph #1:    Alternating photograph #2: 
                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
